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In this thesis I explore key aspects of general equilibrium models widely used in Central Banks,
both in terms of theoretical assumptions and practical implications for policy makers. This
document is divided in four chapters. In the first two chapters I study an alternative to the
rational expectation assumption and its implications in the understanding of the business
cycle, while in the last two chapters I explore policy questions related to the use of these
models in policy.
General equilibrium models traditionally used in the design of monetary policy start from
the premise that agents form their expectations about the economy in a rational manner.
Under rational expectations, agents have full information about the true economic model, and
use it accordingly to form their predictions. In particular, agents are capable of understanding
the nature of macroeconomic shocks and their duration, and have the ability to consistently
incorporate news about the expected evolution of the economy or changes in monetary policy
into their expectations. The theory of rational expectations has been embedded not only
into real business cycle models, but also into more realistic New Keynesian models, including
many of the DSGE models that are used for policy purposes in central banks. However,
in reality, agents are unlikely to have perfect ability to observe and process in an efficient
manner all available information. Thus, on many occasions, the nature of the disturbances, or
their transmission channels, are only imperfectly known by the agents or partially ignored.
Alternatives to this hypothesis have been largely debated in the literature, the first two
chapters explore different aspects of the adaptive learning approach as an alternative to
rational expectations hypothesis, while the last two chapter explore modelling implications
in the policy use of DSGE models.
More precisely, the first chapter assesses the importance of term structure and survey data
information to the adaptive learning literature and the capability of macro-financial DSGE
models with learning expectations to estimate a measure of the term premium associated
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with the 10-year US Treasury bond yield. The introduction of survey data adds a source
of discipline in expectations under adaptive learning, which otherwise, are often criticized
of arbitrary. In this context, this chapter finds that adding term structure information in
agent’s forecasting models improves the overall fit and does a great job in matching the
expectations reported in the SPF across all forward-looking variables of the DSGE model.
The rationale for this finding is that the SPF forecasts are based on real-time data and
the term spread information included in our small forecasting models is also available in
real time. These two pieces of real-time data—SPF and the yield curve— may therefore
share important information in forecasting the economic outlook. This is consistent with the
previous finding that the term structure contains useful information for forecasting real-time
macroeconomic data. The second part of the chapter extends this model up to 10-years to
estimate a measure of the term premium associated with the 10-year US Treasury bond yield
from the medium-scale DSGE model under AL, showing that the inclusion of both term
structure and survey data improves the estimation of the bond term premium, in line with
the from no-arbitrage affine term structure models.
The second chapter looks at the anchoring of inflation expectations in the Euro Area and
the performance of alternative monetary policy rules using a DSGE model with adaptive
learning. The approach used allows a distinction to be drawn between which portion of the
low inflation phenomenon might be due to temporary factors and which might be considered
permanent. The results of the analysis for the euro area suggest that agents perceive the
inflation rate’s recent departure from the monetary policy objective to be predominantly
temporary, although the deviations from target are marked by a considerable degree of per-
sistence. Another relevant aspect is the impact of a prolonged period of low inflation in the
effectiveness of monetary policy, and more importantly, under the presence of the effective
lower bound. The second part of the chapter studies the properties of the monetary pol-
icy regime under the current expectations and studies the transitional effects caused by the
change in inflation expectations of alternative regimes such as asymmetric inflation targeting
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and price-level targeting, now popular in the academic debate. The results show that while
current expectations are curbing the effectiveness of monetary policy under the presence of
the zero lower bound, alternative rules such asymmetric inflation targeting rules (that re-
spond stronger when inflation is below trend) are beneficial to the economy. In addition, this
chapter states the implications in the transition from one monetary policy rule to another,
showing that changing the rule is not very effective until agents have had time to learn about
it. The the announcement of the new rule has the maximum effect agents observe their im-
plementation and learn about it, which requires time, which is very different from what the
standard rational expectations models, where the announcement perfectly anchors agents’
expectations and has immediate effects in the economy.
The third chapter devotes to the importance of real-time data and data revisions in the
business cycle analysis. The main macroeconomic series are regularly revised relative to their
real-time release to incorporate new information, which often, are significant and, if ignored,
may lead to a bias in the study of the business cycle. This chapter provides a detailed analysis
of the statistical properties of data revisions for the euro area and studies the appropriate
modeling of real-time data and its revision in DSGE models for business cycle analysis. The
first part of the chapter provides studies the statistical properties of data revisions in the euro
area, showing that the series of GDP, consumption and inflation are predictable (they are
correlated with the initial announcement) and have high volatility, suggesting that they are
not well-behaved and studies the appropriate characterization of the data revision processes
for its later inclusion in DSGE models. The second part of the paper details how to include
real-time data and its revision in a DSGE model, by assuming that decisions related to GDP,
Consumption and inflation are based on the initial announcement, and acknowledging that
they are subject to revisions. This approach delivers two important results: first, it confirms
the empirical findings from the reduced-form analysis and second, data revisions become an
important source in the business cycle decomposition analysis. In the case of the Euro Area,
they account for one third of the output variability, leading to the conclusion that DSGE
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models omitting real-time data and data revisions might be ignoring important sources of
aggregate fluctuations.
Finally the fourth chapter has an important policy viewpoint, by assessing quantitatively
the transmissions of macroprudential policies in the economy. Macroprudential policies are an
important toolkit of central banks nowadays, this includes borrower-based macroprudential
measures such as limits on loan-to-value and loan-to-income which their assessment has been
traditionally in partial equilibrium models. By combining the model with information on the
distribution of loan-to-value and loan-to-income ratios contained in the loan data, this paper
tracks the impact of borrower-based measures from their impact on credit conditions at loan
origination to the long-term macroeconomic effects on GDP, credit, real estate investment
as well as mortgage defaults and mortgage spreads. The assessment reveals that borrower-
based measures have sizable effects on credit amounts and can reduce long-run defaults.
Its assessment is nevertheless limited to long-term effects, given limitation in the relatively
simple way the real estate market is modeled. It opens up extension possibilities to develop
additional models to shed light on the detailed working of the real estate market by focusing
on additional sources of shocks and the role played by expectations for real estate prices.
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Part I
Adaptive learning with term structure
information
1 Introduction
Since the pioneering publications by Marcet and Sargent (1989) and Evans and Honkapohja
(2001) a growing body of literature (including Preston, 2005; Milani, 2007, 2008, 2011; Eu-
sepi and Preston, 2011; Slobodyan and Wouters, 2012a,b) has considered adaptive learning
(AL) as an alternative to the rational expectations (RE) assumption in characterizing highly
persistent macroeconomic dynamics. Recent papers (Sinha 2015, 2016) focus on some impli-
cations of AL in the yield curve, but there are still a few papers (e.g. Aguilar and Vázquez,
2019) that analyze how term structure information may interact with both learning and
macroeconomic dynamics.
This paper considers the Euler-equation approach to AL suggested in Slobodyan and
Wouters (2012a) to understand the contribution of term structure information in dealing
with the incomplete knowledge issue addressed in the related AL literature.1,2 Term structure
With Jesús Vázquez (UPV/EHU)
1There are two main approaches to AL in the recent literature. The Euler-equation approach focuses on
short-sighted agents, for whom optimal current decisions are based on just one-period-ahead expectations
that show up in the standard Euler equations (e.g. Milani, 2007; Slobodyan and Wouters, 2012a,b), while
the other approach focuses on long-sighted agents (e.g. Preston, 2005; Eusepi and Preston, 2011; Sinha,
2015; and Sinha; 2016), taking into account infinite-horizon forecasts driven by their intertemporal decision
problem. This distinction can be crucial because the second approach results in a much stronger source
of persistent dynamics (see Eusepi and Preston, 2011). By including the term structure of interest rates,
our approach certainly goes beyond the one-period-ahead expectations, but still follows the Euler-equation
approach.
2More generally, the Euler-equation approach falls under the broad class of a restricted perceptions equilib-
rium, where agents use a small misspecified model but form their beliefs optimally given the misspecification
(Sargent, 1991; Hommes and Sorger, 1998; Milani, 2007; Honkapohja, Mitra, and Evans, 2013). Other papers
(Adam, 2005; Orphanides and Williams, 2005; Branch and Evans, 2006; Hommes and Zhu, 2014, Ormeño
and Molnár, 2015) also provide support for the use of small forecasting models on several grounds, including
their forecast performance, their usefulness for facilitating coordination, and their ability to approximate the
Survey of Professional Forecasters well.
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information is used in agents’ forecasting models due to the ability of term spreads to forecast
inflation (Mishkin, 1990) and real economic activity (Estrella and Hardouvelis, 1991; Estrella
and Mishkin, 1997).3
We follow Aguilar and Vázquez (2019) by extending the medium-scale DSGE model
used in Slobodyan and Wouters (2012a) to account for the term structure of interest rates.
This is a behavioral DSGE model where (i) agents are boundedly rational in their economic
decisions; (ii) agents form expectations using simple forecasting models; and (iii) standard
no-arbitrage asset pricing laws hold.4 Our focus, however, is on the small forecasting models
(i.e. AR(2) processes) considered in Slobodyan and Wouters (2012a) augmented with term
structure information rather than the small forecasting models based only on term structure
information used in Aguilar and Vázquez (2019). By considering this minor deviation from
the forecasting models of Slobodyan and Wouters (2012a), we seek to highlight the important
role of term structure information in characterizing macroeconomic forecasts over and above
the macroeconomic information used in AR forecasting models.
The estimation results show that adding term structure information in the small fore-
casting models results in a great improvement in the model fit. Moreover, term structure
information helps to improve the AL performance in forecasting actual revised macroeco-
nomic data used in the estimation procedure as well as in forecasting real-time (i.e. the first
announcements of) macroeconomic data, which are not considered in the estimation. The
latter finding suggests that the term structure of interest rates provides important informa-
tion available in real time in forecasting aggregate variables in addition to that provided by
revised macroeconomic data.
Beyond taking into account term structure information, we extend the analysis in Aguilar
3McCallum (1994) exclusively uses term spreads as simple predictors for future macroeconomic conditions
for defining monetary policy rules.
4As pointed out by Eusepi and Preston (2018, footnote 10), expected yields (returns) under arbitrary
subjective beliefs may not satisfy no-arbitrage with multiple bond maturities (assets). They impose the
expectations hypothesis of the term structure to overcome this issue as we do in this paper. In contrast
to this standard approach to AL, Adam and Marcet (2011) study a framework where the law of iterated
expectations is not satisfied.
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and Vázquez (2019) in three important directions. First, we assess the empirical ability of
the AL formulation augmented with term structure information to match the macroeconomic
forecasts reported in the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF). We find that small fore-
casting models which include term structure information do a much better job in matching
the expectations reported in the SPF across all forward-looking variables of the DSGE model
(that have an SPF counterpart) than the AR(2) processes used in Slobodyan and Wouters
(2012a), thus showing the importance of term structure information for increasing the em-
pirical validity of AL. The rationale for this finding is that the SPF forecasts are based on
real-time data and the term spread information included in our small forecasting models is
also available in real time. These two pieces of real-time data—SPF and the yield curve—
may therefore share important information in forecasting the economic outlook. This finding
is consistent with the above finding that the term structure contains useful information for
forecasting real-time macroeconomic data.
Second, we further assess the performance of AL extended with term structure by dis-
ciplining AL expectations with SPF data in the estimation procedure. A comparison of
the estimation results obtained with and without disciplining AL expectations with SPF
data suggests that the need to discipline expectations is greatly reduced by including term
structure information in the forecasting models.
Finally, we extend the analysis in Aguilar and Vázquez (2019) to estimate a measure of
the term premium associated with the 10-year US Treasury bond yield from the medium-
scale DSGE model under AL. Interestingly, our estimated AL bond term premium comoves
with the corresponding measure estimated by Adrian, Crump and Moench (2013) using a
no-arbitrage affine term structure model.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the DSGE model
and the AL extension based on term structure information. Section 3 shows the estimation
results and discusses their implications. Section 4 analyzes the empirical validity of model
expectations when compared with actual revised data, real-time data, and the SPF forecasts.
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Section 5 concludes.
2 An AL model with term structure
Our model builds on the Smets and Wouters (2007) model and its AL extension studied by
Slobodyan and Wouters (2012a), henceforth called SlW. Seeking to understand the contri-
bution of term structure (TS) information in dealing with the incomplete knowledge issue
addressed by AL, we follow Aguilar and Vázquez (2019) by extending the medium-scale
DSGE model to account for the TS of interest rates5. However, we focus on the small fore-
casting models—AR(2) processes—considered in SlW but augmented with TS information
rather than the small forecasting models featuring only TS information used in Aguilar and
Vázquez (2019). The consideration of this small deviation from the AR forecasting models
considered in SlW enables us to identify the important contribution of TS information in the
characterization of macroeconomic forecasts.
Next we present the main extensions of the model.6
2.1 The DSGE model
As in Smets and Wouters (2007), the model is characterized by the following sources of
endogenous persistence: (i) Household preferences featuring external habits regarding con-
sumption; (ii) labor supplied by households differentiated by a union with monopoly power
setting sticky nominal wages à la Calvo (1983); (iii) capital investment decided by house-
holds and subject to capital adjustment costs; (iv) the degree of capital utilization, also
determined by households, as a positive function of the rental rate of capital, which depends
on the capital utilization adjustment costs; (v) intermediate firms setting the prices of their
differentiated goods à la Calvo under monopolistic competition; and (vi) finally, wages and
5We also asume logarithmic utility function with constant risk aversion, which constraints from exepcta-
tions in employment.
6The remaining log-linearized equations of the model are presented in a supplementary appendix available
from the authors upon request.
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prices which are both partially indexed to lagged inflation when they are not re-optimized.
2.2 The term structure extension
Following Jermann (1998), among many others,7 we extend the DSGE model under AL with
term structure by considering the stochastic discount factor of households as the pricing
kernel for bonds. Formally, the Euler equation of the representative household optimization
problem associated with the demand for the n-period bond is given by the following no-
arbitrage condition







which shows that the price at time t of a zero-coupon bond that makes a single payment of
one dollar at time t+ n, PBn,t, is equal to the (expected) n-period stochastic discount factor,
mt,n, times the payoff (one dollar). Et denotes the AL subjective expectation operator,8 β is
the subjective discount factor, UC denotes the marginal utility of consumption, and Ct and
Nt stand for consumption and labor, respectively.
It is important to emphasize here that the SlW-DSGE model features standard optimality
conditions for households and firms with the only difference that the expectations operator
Et represents AL subjective expectations and not RE. As in Sinha (2016) and Eusepi and
Preston (2011, 2018), AL beliefs are assumed to be homogeneous across households and firms,
though individual agents do not have knowledge of the beliefs of other agents—i.e. households
(firms) are identical, but they do not know this to be so. As a consequence, agents do not
know the equilibrium evolution of the aggregate variables. The AL expectations process is
described below.
Equation (1) can be re-arranged so that the n-period bond price at t is related to the
7See, for instance, De Graeve, Emiris and Wouters (2009) and Bekaert, Cho and Moreno (2010) in the
context of RE-DSGE models, and Sinha (2016) in a DSGE model under AL.
8In order to simplify notation, we do not distinguish between the expectation operators under AL and
RE, since we focus exclusively on the former.
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(expected) one-period stochastic discount factor, mt,1, and the (n− 1)-period bond price at























where the last equality holds under the law of iterated expectations. As described below, we
use small forecasting models based on linear least squares projections in our AL approach,
and this type of projection (regression) implies that the law of iterated expectations holds
(Sargent, 1987, chapter X).9
After repeated substitutions, the last equation can be written in terms of the (expectations







1,t+2 · · ·PB1,t+(n−1)
)
.







1,t+2 + · · ·+ pB1,t+(n−1)
)
,
where lower-case variables denote variables expressed in logs. The last equation can be









9We put aside asset pricing issues put forward by Adam and Marcet (2011), which arise from agents
having heterogeneous information sets. As discussed in Honkapohja, Mitra and Evans (2013), standard
formulations of AL assume that the law of iterated expectations holds for the subjective expectations of each
individual agent. Moreover, it should be noted that agents are assumed to have homogeneous expectations
in our framework and each agent considers itself the marginal trader when planning future asset allocations
(as in Sinha, 2016; and Eusepi and Preston, 2018), so the law of iterated expectations in fact holds for the
expectations of the marginal bond trader. Furthermore, the resulting symmetric equilibrium confirms these
assumptions since all agents are identical (i.e. they face identical optimization problems and their beliefs are
homogeneous).
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since r{n}t = −pBn,t/n, and rt denotes the interest rate associated with the one-period bond.
Equation (2) represents the log pure version of the expectations hypothesis (EH) defined in
terms of the AL expectations operator.
As is standard in empirical applications of term structure models, we augment equation











This term premium shock is defined as the wedge between the model-implied yield given by
(2) and the observed yield, and it can be interpreted as a measure of fluctuations in the risk
premium (De Graeve, Emiris and Wouters, 2009).10
Our baseline estimated DSGE model relies on the EH hypothesis, equation (3) for n = 4,
together with the set of log-linearized dynamic equations used in SlW—described in an
appendix— which among others includes the log-linearized version of the optimality condition
(1) for n = 1 augmented with a risk premium shock, εbt .
As in SlW, we deviate from the monetary policy rule in the Smets and Wouters (2007)
model by assuming that the monetary authorities follow a Taylor-type rule, reacting to
inflation, output gap, and output gap growth, where the output gap is defined as the deviation
of output from its underlying neutral productivity process. Moreover, the monetary policy
rule assumed in SlW is slightly modified to include TS information as in Vázquez, María-
Dolores and Londoño (2013). This assumption is in line with the TS information introduced
in the small forecasting models of AL agents below. Formally,
rt = ρrrt−1 + (1− ρr) [rππt + ryŷt] + r∆y∆ŷt + rspsp{4}t + εrt , (4)
where the output gap is defined as ŷt = yt − Φεat (i.e. the output gap is defined as the
10Since we focus on government bonds in our empirical analysis, ξ{n}t can also be understood as a conve-
nience yield term (see, among others, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2012; Greenwood et al., 2015;
Del Negro et al., 2017) defined as a stochastic premium related to the safety and liquidity attributes of (US)
government bonds relative to assets with the same payoff, but without such singular features.
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deviation of output from its underlying neutral productivity process), and sp{4}t = r
{4}
t − rt
denotes the term spread associated with the 1-year maturity yield.11
2.3 Adaptive learning with term structure information
This section provides a brief explanation of how AL expectation formation works.12 A DSGE







+ A2Etyt+j +B0εt = 0,
where yt is the vector of endogenous variables at time t, Etyt+j contains multi-period-ahead
expectations, and wt is a vector including eight exogenous shocks and the lagged innovations,
εt−1, of the price- and wage-markup shocks since they are modeled as ARMA(1, 1) processes.
Agents are assumed to have a limited view of the economy under AL. Their so-called “per-
ceived law of motion” (PLM) processes—i.e. their small forecasting models— are generally
defined as follows:
yt+j = X tβ
{j}
t−1 + ut+j, for j = 1, 2, ..., n,
where y is the vector containing the forward-looking variables of the model, X is the matrix
of regressors, β{j} is the vector of updating parameters, which includes an intercept, and u is
a vector of errors. These errors are linear combinations of the true model innovations. The
variance-covariance matrices, Σ = E[ut+juTt+j], are therefore non-diagonal. Agents are further
assumed to use simple econometric tools under AL. In particular, they use a linear least
squares projection scheme in which the parameters are updated to form their expectations
for each forward-looking variable: Etyt+j = Xtβ
{j}
t−1. The updating parameter vector, β,
which results from stacking all the vectors β{j}, is further assumed to follow an autoregressive
11As in SlW, all but a few of the structural shocks follow AR(1) processes. The price- and wage-markup
shocks follow ARMA(1,1) processes, and the AR(1) productivity shock allows for an interaction with the
government spending shock.
12For a detailed explanation see Slobodyan and Wouters (2012a,b).
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process where agents’ beliefs are updated through a Kalman filter as described below. This
updating expectation process can be represented as in SlW by the equation: βt − β̄ =
F (βt−1 − β̄) + vt, where F is a diagonal matrix with the learning parameter | ρ |≤ 1 on the
main diagonal and vt are i.i.d. errors with variance-covariance matrix V . This standard AL
approach assumes that agents do not take into account the fact that their belief coefficients
will be revised in the future (e.g. Sinha (2016) and Eusepi and Preston (2011, 2018)). This
assumption can be rationalized by using an anticipated utility approach put forward in Kreps
(1998) and Sargent (1999).13
Notice that each expectational horizon is estimated separately in our AL approach. This
is in clear contrast to the maintained beliefs hypothesis suggested in Preston (2005)—an
approach also followed in Eusepi and Preston (2011) and Sinha (2015, 2016)— which not
only imposes an infinite forecast horizon, but also considers iterated forecasts used under
the MSV approach. Nevertheless, our approach shares with other AL approaches the use of
forecasting models based on linear least squares projections, which implies that the law of
iterated expectations holds: Et (Et+hyt+j) = Etyt+j, for any j > h > 0 (see Sargent (1987,
chapter X, pp. 223-229) for a formal discussion), and this is consistent with the law of
iterated expectations assumed in the derivation of the log pure version of the EH, equation
(2), above.
Once the expectations of the forward-looking variables,Etyt+j, are computed they are
plugged into the matrix representation of the DSGE model to obtain a backward-looking
representation of the model as follows
 yt
wt




where the time-varying matrices µt, Tt and Rt are nonlinear functions of structural parameters
13The anticipated utility approach assumes that agents do not take into account future updates of beliefs
when making current decisions but are otherwise fully optimal. This is in contrast to the Bayesian belief
approach, which takes belief updates into account.
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(entering into matrices A0, A1, A2 and B0) together with the learning coefficients, β. This
representation of the model is called the actual law of motion (ALM).
The standard Kalman-filter updating and transition equations for the belief coefficients
and their corresponding covariance matrix are given by











where (βt+1|t − β̄) = F (βt|t − β̄). βt|t−1 is the estimate of β using the information up to time
t − 1 (but further considering the autoregressive process followed by β), Rt|t−1 is the mean
squared error associated with βt|t−1. Therefore, the updated learning vector βt|t is equal to
the previous one, βt|t−1, plus a correction term that depends on the previous forecast error,(
yt − Xt−1βt|t−1
)
. The mean squared error, Rt|t, associated with this updated estimate is
given by









with Rt+1|t = FRt|tF T + V .
The initialization of this Kalman filter for the belief coefficients requires the specification
of β1|0 = β, R1|0, Σ, and V . We follow Slobodyan and Wouters (2012a), where all these
expressions are derived from the correlations between the model variables implied by the RE
equilibrium evaluated at the corresponding structural parameter vector.
A PLM with term structure information
The baseline small forecasting models assumed in SlW are simple AR(2) processes. That is,








where the intercept of the PLM, θ{j}y,t−1, captures the low frequency movements of the corre-






measure the persistence of beliefs.
We analyze the importance of introducing TS information by simply augmenting these












where the coefficient β{j}y,3,t−1 captures agents’ reaction to the term spread information while
forecasting Etyt+j.
This small modification in the PLM enables us to clearly identify the contribution of
TS information beyond that provided by current and lagged values of the forward-looking
variables considered in SlW.14
3 Estimation results
We begin this section by describing the data and the estimation approach, then proceed to
discuss the model fit, estimation results, a comparison of actual and simulated moments, the
variance decomposition of shocks, and the estimate of the smoothed AL term premium.
3.1 Data and estimation approach
We estimate the AL model extended with TS for the alternative specifications of the PLM
using US data for two sample periods: The whole sample period running from 1965:4 until
2009:1 and a subsample from 1981:4 until 2009:1. The set of observable variables used for
the whole sample period estimation is the same one used by Slobodyan and Wouters (2012a)
(i.e. the quarterly series of the inflation rate, the Fed funds rate, the log of hours worked,
the quarterly log differences in real consumption, real investment, real wages, and real GDP)
14Aguilar and Vázquez (2019) also consider TS information but they deviate much further from the PLM
assumed in SlW by considering only the term spread in the PLM. The approach followed here makes it easier
to identify the contribution made by adding TS information over and above the information provided by AR
processes.
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plus the 1-year zero-coupon Treasury yield (i.e. a set of eight observable variables).15
The estimation of the shorter sample period extends the set of observables considered in
the whole sample period to include six observable forecasts reported in the SPF. More pre-
cisely, we consider the SPF forecasts available, which have counterparts in forward-looking
variables in the DSGE model: 1-quarter-ahead forecasts of inflation, 1-quarter-ahead fore-
casts of the consumption and investment growth rates, and 1-, 2- and 3-quarter-ahead fore-
casts of the short-term nominal interest rate16,17 Analyzing this shorter sample period, but
with a larger number of observables, enables us to assess the importance of TS information in
disciplining model expectations by fitting SPF forecasts as well as assessing the robustness of
results by studying a sample period featuring both milder aggregate fluctuations (the Great
Moderation) and an inflation downtrend, which is in sharp contrast with the stagflation in
the 1970s and early 1980s present in the first-half of the whole sample period.
15The zero-coupon Treasury bond yields come from the Gürkaynak, Sack and Wright (2007) data set
available on the research data website of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve.
16Del Negro and Eusepi (2011) pioneer the use of SPF expectation data to discipline RE in DSGE models.
A few more recent papers (Ormeño and Molnar, 2015; Aguilar and Vázquez, 2018) also use SPF data to
discipline AL expectations in DSGE models.
17SPF forecasts were downloaded from the website of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. Inflation
forecasts are reported back to the late 1960’s, but the rest of the forecast time series starts at 1981:3. Thus,
data availability partially determines the choice of the first period in the short sample. Moreover, the initial
quarter of the short sample roughly coincides with the start of a successful disinflation period.
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{2}
r,t





where l and dl represent the log and the log difference, respectively. γ = 100(γ − 1) is the
common quarterly trend growth rate for real GDP, real consumption, real investment, and
real wages. l̄, π, r and r{4} are the steady-state levels of hours worked, inflation, the federal
funds rate, and the 1-year (4-quarter) bond yield, respectively. The superscripts SPF and
{j} in the last six rows of the measurement equation denote actual forecasts from the SPF
and the corresponding forecast horizon for j = 1, 2, 3; respectively. As in Ormeño and Molnár
(2015), the measurement errors, ε, showing the deviations of model expectations from the
actual forecasts reported in the SPF, are assumed to be i.i.d. processes. We also allow for
differences in trend growth rates across SPF (consumption and investment) forecasts as well
as differences between the steady-state levels of actual and SPF forecast data.
The measurement equation (7) reduces to the first eight equations when the alternative
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versions of the AL model are estimated for the whole sample period, whereas the complete
system (7) is used for the short sample period when SPF data is considered in the estimation
procedure.
We follow a Bayesian estimation procedure. First, the log posterior function is maximized
by combining prior information on the parameters with the likelihood of the data. The prior
assumptions are exactly the same as in Slobodyan and Wouters (2012a). In addition, we
consider loose priors for the parameters characterizing both the 1-year yield dynamics and
the measurement error processes. The Metropolis-Hastings algorithm is used to generate the
posterior distribution and to compute the log density of the model.18
3.2 Posterior estimates
Our estimated AL model with TS (henceforth called the SlW-TS model) only differs from
that of Slobodyan and Wouters (2012a) (henceforth called the SlW model) in the specification
of the small forecasting models.
Table 1 shows the estimation results for the various PLM specifications and the various
samples considered. Our sample period is almost identical to the one considered in SlW.
Thus, the first column of Table 1 shows the estimation results of the SlW model for the whole
sample period 1966:1-2009:1 using their original set of seven observable variables, whereas the
second and third columns report the estimation results using the PLM of SlW and the PLM
augmented with TS information (SlW-TS) as described by equations (5) and (6), respectively.
The remaining two columns show the estimation results for the two PLM specifications for
the short sample period running from 1981:4 until 2009:1, where the SPF time series are also
included in the set of observables as described in the measurement equation (7).19
For each model estimated, Table 1 firstly reports the number of observable time series,
18The DSGE models are estimated using Dynare codes kindly provided by Sergey Slobodyan and Raf
Wouters with a few modifications to accommodate the presence of TS information in both the structural
model and the small forecasting models, as described above.
19For the short sample period, we find that simpler specifications of the two PLM built on AR(1) processes—
i.e. imposing β{j}y,2,t−1 = 0 in equations (5) and (6)— improve the model fit. The estimation results reported
for the short sample period are based on these simpler specifications.
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and the model fit based on the log data density. The remaining rows show the posterior mean
and the corresponding 90 percent interval of the posterior distribution—in parentheses—for
four groups of selected parameters. The first and second groups contain the parameters for
real and nominal rigidities, respectively. The third group contains the parameters which
describe the ARMA coefficients characterizing price and wage markup shocks. Finally, the
fourth group contains the policy rule parameters.20
A comparison of column 1 in Table 1 with the figures reported in Slobodyan and Wouters
(2012a, Table 1, p. 74) shows a similar fit and almost identical parameter estimates. This
suggests that including or ignoring a few quarterly observations and assuming a logarithmic
utility function has no impact on the estimation results.
The consequences of considering the 1-year Treasury bill
A comparison of columns 1 and 2 shows that including the 1-year Treasury bill as an ob-
servable in the SlW model decreases the importance of a few sources of endogenous rigidity,
such as Calvo price and wage parameters, price and wage indexation parameters, and the
parameter featuring the capital utilization adjusting cost, ψ. The rationale for this decrease
in a few sources of endogenous persistence is that considering the EH of the term structure
(equation (3)) brings with it additional persistence in (the expected path of) the short-term
rate that is transmitted to other aggregate variables. Moreover, there is a large increase in
persistence driven by the increase in the AR coefficients that describe the processes of price
and wage markup shocks.
20All parameter estimates are reported in a supplementary appendix available from the authors upon
request.
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Table 1. Selected parameter estimates
Without SPF data (1965:4-2009:1) With SPF data (1981:4-2009:1)
SlW SlW SlW-TS SlW SlW-TS
Number of observables 7 8 8 14 14
log data density -984.930 -1092.600 -1057.596 -1070.311 -853.960
Parameters associated with real rigidities
habit formation 0.787 0.851 0.759 0.631 0.630
(h) (0.742,0.833) (0.842,0.878) (0.745,0.788) (0.607,0.643) (0.611,0.643)
cost of adjusting capital 4.846 7.975 4.616 4.219 5.294
(ϕ) (3.257,6.491) (7.946,8.014) (4.579,4.646) (4.192,4.258) (5.168,5.323)
capital utilization adjusting cost 0.611 0.151 0.092 0.163 0.050
(ψ) (0.424,0.819) (0.149,0.180) (0.085,0.100) (0.153,0.171) (0.046,0.053)
Parameters associated with nominal rigidities
price Calvo probability 0.612 0.472 0.545 0.617 0.715
(ξp) (0.544,0.684) (0.459,0.487) (0.524,0.554) (0.598,0.630) (0.702,0.730)
wage Calvo probability 0.774 0.565 0.464 0.495 0.259
(ξw) (0.721,0.831) (0.549,0.589) (0.456,0.482) (0.485,0.511) (0.245,0.268)
price indexation 0.372 0.178 0.377 0.896 0.820
(ιp) (0.169,0.566) (0.151,0.192) (0.325,0.401) (0.884,0.928) (0.796,0.863)
wage indexation 0.386 0.185 0.470 0.218 0.400
(ιw) (0.203,0.582) (0.107,0.229) (0.410,0.486) (0.195,0.237) (0.337,0.437)
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Table 1. (Continued)
Without SPF data (1965:4-2009:1) With SPF data (1981:4-2009:1)
SlW SlW SlW-TS SlW SlW-TS
Parameters associated with price and wage markups
markup price AR coef. 0.457 0.880 0.875 0.609 0.575
(ρp) (0.130,0.786) (0.860,0.904) (0.875,0.911) (0.584,0.690) (0.558,0.602)
markup wage AR coef. 0.554 0.838 0.918 0.843 0.938
(ρw ) (0.287,0.827) (0.827,0.853) (0.909,0.928) (0.833,0.858) (0.929,0.950)
markup price MA coef. 0.476 0.608 0.693 0.590 0.747
(µp) (0.224,0.742) (0.591,0.635) (0.676,0.711) (0.547,0.638) (0.741,0.769)
markup wage MA coef. 0.494 0.325 0.477 0.556 0.450
(µw) (0.209,0.793) (0.309,0.368) (0.454,0.517) (0.543,0.569) (0.422,0.487)
Policy rule parameters
inertia 0.880 0.884 0.886 0.834 0.835
(ρr) (0.85,0.92) (0.881,0.907) (0.878,0.896) (0.808,0.845) (0.819,0.849)
inflation 1.692 1.662 1.617 2.373 1.854
(rπ) (1.384,2.01) (1.659,1.683) (1.570,1.643) (2.291,2.394) (1.762,1.888)
output 0.101 0.075 0.038 0.080 0.082
(ry) (0.043,0.159) (0.065,0.095) (0.033,0.047) (0.068,0.089) (0.075,0.092)
output growth 0.118 0.122 0.144 0.075 0.040
(r∆y ) (0.087,0.150) (0.104,0.131) (0.132,0.154) (0.068,0.090) (0.036,0.053)
term spread - 0.255 0.140 0.112 0.155
(rsp ) - (0.218,0.284) (0.118,0.159) (0.086,0.145) (0.129,0.174)
Notes: Parameter notation and 90% intervals of the posterior distribution in parentheses.
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The consequences of considering TS information in the PLM
A comparison of the marginal likelihood values in columns 2 and 3 shows that the switch
from the SlW learning scheme to our learning scheme augmented with TS information, SlW-
TS, results in an appreciable improvement in model fit of [−1057.596 − (−1092.600) = ]35
log-points. Regarding the posterior estimates of parameters, the SlW-TS model results in
a reduction of the parameters associated with real rigidities and an increase in most of the
parameters that include nominal rigidities (i.e. the Calvo price parameter and the price and
wage indexation parameters), while for many of the rest the estimates are fairly similar across
the two learning specifications.
The consequences of considering the Great Moderation period and SPF data
The improvement is much greater when SPF data is considered in the shorter sample (1981:4-
2009:1), which mostly covers the Great Moderation, which features milder aggregate fluctu-
ations, economic growth, and downtrend inflation. Thus, the improvement in the marginal
likelihood of considering TS information in the PLM is 216.62 points, which results in a huge
posterior odd of 1.19e+94 in favor of the AL specification augmented with TS information.
As shown below, this huge difference is due to the impressive ability of the learning scheme
with TS to match SPF expectations in this period.
We find that most posterior estimates of parameters in the short sample are fairly similar
across learning specifications, though there are a few exceptions. Thus, the estimate of the
elasticity of the cost adjusting capital, ϕ, is higher for the learning specification including
TS information (5.3 versus 4.2), whereas the opposite occurs for the response of the nominal
interest rate to inflation (1.9 versus 2.4). Moreover, a comparison of parameter estimates
across the two samples studied suggests that the Calvo price probability and price indexation
estimates (ξp and ιp, respectively) increase during this downtrend inflation period as expected,
whereas the estimates of Calvo wage probability, ξw, habit formation, h, and the elasticity
of capital utilization adjusting cost, ψ, decrease further in relation to the estimates reported
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in the first column and in Slobodyan and Wouters (2012a).
3.3 Model fit
Along with the overall model fit based on the posterior log data density, we also analyze
the performance of the two options for PLM specifications in reproducing selected second-
moment statistics obtained from actual data as shown in Table 2. We focus on four types of
moment: Standard deviations, contemporaneous correlations of each observable with output
growth and with inflation, respectively, and first-order autocorrelations.
As for the actual size of fluctuations, we observe that the two AL formulations have trouble
in matching the standard deviation of a few observable variables: Both models generate too
much volatility, although this problem is clearly less severe for the PLM specification with TS
information. Thus, this specification is able to match the volatility of the nominal variables
reasonably well. For the other three types of second-moment statistics, the PLM specification
including TS information also performs better in general than the SlW specification.
27
Table 2. Actual and simulated second moments
Actual ∆y ∆c ∆inv ∆w Hours π r r{4}
Std. dev. 0.87 0.74 2.21 0.66 2.83 0.59 0.83 0.71
Corr. (∆y) 1.0 0.70 0.71 0.09 0.17 -0.23 -0.13 -0.03
Corr. (π) -0.23 -0.28 -0.09 -0.13 -0.42 1.0 0.64 0.59
Autocorr. 0.30 0.27 0.56 0.03 0.95 0.88 0.94 0.94
SlW+TS ∆y ∆c ∆inv ∆w Hours π r r{4}
Std. dev. 1.23 0.96 2.64+ 0.71∗ 4.06∗ 0.66∗ 0.85∗ 0.95∗
(1.08,1.38) (0.84,1.09) (2.25,3.11) (0.64,0.77) (2.48,6.16) (0.48,0.86) (0.60,1.16) (0.65,1.33)
Corr. (∆y) 1.0 0.82 0.72∗ 0.41 0.09∗ -0.04∗ 0.03∗ 0.18
– (0.76,0.87) (0.63,0.79) (0.30,0.51) (0.02,0.17) (-0.23,-0.15) (-0.14,0.19) (0.02,0.33)
Corr. (π) -0.04∗ -0.02 -0.05∗ -0.01+ 0.11 1.0 0.62∗ 0.42∗
(-0.23,0.15) (-0.20,0.16) (-0.30,0.19) (-0.12,0.10) (-0.34,0.54) – (0.36,0.81) (0.01,0.74)
Autocorr. 0.35∗ 0.42+ 0.53∗ 0.02∗ 0.97∗ 0.79∗ 0.92∗ 0.93∗
(0.20,0.48) (0.28,0.55) (0.39,0.67) (-0.11,0.15) (0.94,0.99) (0.64,0.89) (0.88,0.96) (0.88,0.97)
SlW ∆y ∆c ∆inv ∆w Hours π r r{4}
Std. dev. 1.68 1.45 3.07 0.92 3.93∗ 0.77∗ 1.28+ 1.28
(1.45,1.93) (1.25,1.69) (2.58,3.61) (0.84,1.01) (2.76,5.37) (0.57,1.04) (0.86,1.82) (0.87,1.80)
Corr. (∆y) 1.0 0.85 0.71∗ 0.35 0.15∗ 0.08 0.07 0.16
– (0.80,0.90) (0.62,0.79) (0.22,0.46) (0.10,0.21) (-0.11,0.26) (-0.06,0.19) (0.04,0.28)
Corr. (π) 0.08 0.06 0.11∗ 0.09 0.20∗ 1.0 0.61∗ 0.57∗
(-0.11,0.26) (-0.12,0.24) (-0.11,0.34) (-0.01,0.19) (-0.22,0.56) – (0.35,0.81) (0.28,0.79)
Autocorr. 0.37∗ 0.44+ 0.59∗ 0.04∗ 0.95∗ 0.64+ 0.95∗ 0.93∗
(0.22,0.52) (0.28,0.58) (0.46,0.71) (-0.08,0.17) (0.92,0.98) (0.35,0.84) (0.91,0.98) (0.87,0.97)
Note: Simulated statistics are computed from the state-space representation for 5,000 random draws from the posterior
distributions. We report the mean and the 90% highest-posterior-density interval associated with each simulated moment
statistic in parentheses. A star (cross) next to a simulated statistic indicates that the actual statistic lies within (is close to
either the upper or the lower bound of) the posterior-density interval.
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3.4 Variance decomposition
Table 3 shows the variance decomposition for most of the variables used in the estimation
procedure for the AL specification with TS information at the 1-year (first component in
each cell) and 10-year forecast horizons (second component in each cell). The estimated
AL model shows that risk premium and exogenous spending shocks are the main contrib-
utors to explaining output growth fluctuations, while risk premium shocks explain almost
all consumption growth fluctuations. Price markup shocks explain 72% (50%) of inflation
variability at the 1-year (10-year) forecast horizon while wage markup shocks explain 91%
of real wage fluctuations. The variance decompositions of output growth and inflation are
somewhat similar to those reported in SlW. The only noteworthy differences are that risk
premium shocks are more important for the SlW formulation whereas the opposite is true
for the exogenous spending shock, and the role of productivity shocks in explaining output
growth fluctuations becomes negligible when TS information is not considered in the SlW
(8% in our model versus 2% in SlW).
Monetary policy and risk premium shocks are observed to make an important contribution
to the variability of the short-term interest rate and the 1-year yield. Moreover, term premium
shocks play an important role in explaining the short- and long-term fluctuations of the 1-year
yield (26% and 45%, respectively) and the long-term variability of hours worked (21%). In
contrast to the findings of Aguilar and Vázquez (2019), term premium shocks are found here
to play a minor role in explaining the fluctuations of inflation and the short-term nominal
interest rate.21
21They show that a PLM featuring only TS information implies that term premium shocks explain roughly
30% of the long-term variability of both inflation and the short-term interest rate.
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Table 3. Variance decomposition
∆y ∆c ∆inv ∆w Hours π r r{4}
Productivity 8/8 0/1 0/0 0/0 16/5 10/18 8/7 6/4
Risk premium 45/44 94/90 13/14 5/4 51/46 2/8 20/33 17/20
Exogenous spending 36/34 0/1 0/0 0/0 21/9 0/0 7/6 6/4
Invest. specific tech. 7/8 0/0 83/81 0/0 7/2 0/0 3/3 2/3
Monetary policy 2/3 4/5 2/2 1/1 3/13 1/2 58/39 40/19
Price markup 0/0 0/1 0/0 2/2 0/2 72/50 3/6 2/3
Wage markup 1/1 0/0 0/0 91/91 0/2 10/13 1/3 1/1
Term premium 1/2 1/3 2/3 1/2 1/21 4/9 0/3 26/45
Notes: Each cell reports the contributions of the corresponding variable to the forecast error variance for the 1-year and the
10-year forecast horizons, respectively.
3.5 Term premium estimates
This subsection compares the AL term premium estimated using TS information with some
term premium measures estimated in the literature. In particular, we consider the term
premia estimated from two non-arbitrage affine models suggested by Adrian, Crump and
Moench (2013)—henceforth called ACM— and Kim and Wright (2005)—referred as KW—
respectively, and the term premium estimated from a DSGE model under RE by Drew-Becker
(2014)—called DB. As is standard in the related literature, we focus on the long-term premia
associated with the 10-year yield. Therefore, we estimate the AL-DSGE model also using
the 10-year yield as an observable variable and the corresponding non-arbitrage condition
(3) for j = 40. Considering a long term maturity yield such as the 10-year yield under the
EH implies the need to characterize the expectations of the short-term interest rate up to
the 39-quarter horizon. In our AL setup, a long forecasting horizon dramatically increases
the number of expectation functions of the short-term interest rate, leading to a curse of
dimensionality problem. To deal with this issue we assume the following simple recursive
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(rt + Etrt+1 + Etrt+2 + Etrt+3) ,
Etrt+j = µrEtrt+j−1, j ≥ 5,
(8)
where the initialization of this recursive structure, Etrt+4 , is given by the 1-year yield implied
by the EH. This structure builds on the forecasting rules described in equation (6) above
which, among others, characterize Etrt+j, for j = 1, 2, 3. Preliminary estimation results
showed that the parameter µr is poorly identified, so we set µr = 0.998, which implies a very
slow decay of short-term interest rate expectations over time that is in line with the high
persistence of the short-term rate.








× 4 when written in annualized
levels—i.e. the estimate of the steady-state 10-year bond term premium, r{40} − r, is added
to the corresponding term-premium measured in deviation from its steady-state value, ξ{40}t ,
as described in equation (3). Figure 1 shows two AL term premium measures obtained from
the estimated AL with TS information model. The dark-blue solid line shows the AL term
premium without using the ACM term premium as observable, and the light-blue dashed
line shows the AL term premium when the ACM term premium is included in the set of
observables. Considering the ACM term premium as an observable variable in the estimation
procedure clearly helps to close the gap between the levels of the AL and ACM term premia
since it allows for an improvement in the identification of the steady-state 10-year bond term
premium, r{40} − r. Nevertheless, the two estimated AL term premia are highly correlated
(0.86).
Figure 1 also shows the KW (purple short-dashed line) and DB (red dashed line) measures
for the periods in which they are published. As discussed in the related literature (see, for
instance, Swanson, 2007; Cohen, Hördahl, and Xia, 2018), it is rather common to find major
discrepancies (around 200 basis points or even higher) between alternative measures for short
periods of time. For instance, the discrepancy between the AL and ACM measures is roughly
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200 basis points around 1984 for one of the AL measures, but the discrepancy between the
ACM and DB term premia is much larger for the same period (roughly 450 basis points!).
Another substantial discrepancy appears around the 2001-2002 recession, when the differences
between the DB term premium and any other term premium take values close to 5%, whereas
the differences between any pair of the rest of the term premium measures are around 1%
in all cases. These discrepancies across models are not, however, explained by fitting errors
implied by the alternative models, as all models tend to fit the yield data very well (as indeed
our AL-DSGE model does (see Figure 2 below)). In spite of large discrepancies for a few
periods, the differences between alternative term premia are in general less than 100 basis
points.
Focusing on the comparison between the AL and ACM term premia, it can be observed
that the fluctuations in the ACM term premium are slightly milder than those in the AL term
premium: The standard deviations of these two term premium measures are 1.13 and 1.38,
respectively (1.28 when the ACM term premium is not included in the set of observables).
Moreover, both AL and ACMmeasures exhibit an upward trend during the Stagflation period
and a downward trend during the disinflation period, which implies that the two measures are
contemporaneously correlated (0.86 with the ACM measure in the set of observables and 0.65
without it). They also exhibit a high degree of persistence (the first-order autocorrelation
coefficient is 0.96 for the ACM term premium and roughly 0.93 for the two AL term premia).
Furthermore, the correlations between the ACM and AL and the cyclical measure of GDP
obtained from the Hodrick and Prescott filter (Hodrick and Prescott, 1997) show a weak
countercyclicality (-0.30, and -0.26, respectively) somewhat in line with the findings in the
related literature (e.g. in Campbell and Cochrane, 1999; Cochrane and Piazzesi, 2005; Bauer,
Rudebusch and Wu, 2014). This correlation is a little lower at -0.17 when the ACM term
premium is removed from the set of observables.
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Figure 1. 10-year term premia









Figure 2 shows the actual figure and the forecast for the 10-year yield based on the AL-
DSGE model together with the estimated average of the expected path of the short-term rate
over 10 years (i.e. the estimated 10-year yield implied by the EH of the term structure). It
is clear that the estimated 10-year yield implied by the EH under AL shows great variability
over the sample period, but it also shows a relatively small variability in the early 1980s when
the 10-year yield shows the twin-peak fluctuations, which results in the large fluctuations of
the estimated AL term premium shown in Figure 1.
Figure 2. Actual and forecast 10-year yields, and the estimated average of the expected
path of the short-term rate over 10 years
The relatively small variability of the expectations of the short-term rate in the early
1980’s is confirmed in Figure 3, where the belief coefficients associated with a few forward-
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looking variables are shown. Thus, the bottom left graph in Figure 3 shows that the average
of the short-term belief coefficients for the 1- 2- and 3-quarter ahead AL expectations does
not capture the high variability of the federal funds rate in the early 1980s.
Figure 3 also shows that the term spread coefficients associated with the PLM of the
alternative forward-looking variables exhibit great variability in general, capturing a strong
reaction by agents to the spread while forecasting key macroeconomic variables. This is true
in particular for investment beliefs, for which the term spread coefficient increases around
recessions (in the mid and late 1970s, early 1980s, the 2001-2002 period, and before the Great
Recession).
Figure 3. Time variation of belief coefficients
Note: The coefficients shown for the short-term interest rate are the averages of the corresponding belief coefficients for the
1- 2- and 3-quarter ahead AL expectations.
An analysis of the contemporaneous cross-correlations between the three types of belief
coefficient (i.e. the intercept, the sum of the AR coefficients, and the term spread coefficient)
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also shows an interesting finding: There is a strong correlation between the term spread
belief coefficient and the corresponding PLM’s intercept of real variables (consumption and
investment), indicating that the variability in the agent’s reaction to the term spread is
somewhat linked to the perception on the low-frequency movements of consumption and
investment. Thus, the estimated correlation between the intercept and the term spread
coefficient is negative at -0.73 for consumption beliefs, and positive at 0.79 for investment
beliefs. Similarly, we also find a strong negative correlation between the intercept and the sum
of the AR coefficients for consumption (-0.71), inflation (-0.85), and short-term rate (-0.77)
beliefs indicating that both types of belief coefficient also compete to capture expectations
about the low-frequency movements of these variables.
4 The empirical validity of the PLM
This section analyzes the empirical validity of the PLM implied by the two specification
options in order to assess the contribution of TS information to both improve model fit and
match SPF forecasts.
Table 4 shows the RMSE statistics from the PLM forecasts for the forward-looking vari-
ables that have observable counterparts. We also include the 1-year yield implied by the pure
EH (i.e. the one-year yield implied by (2) where the term premium is restricted to zero).
To assess the PLM (i.e. perceived law of motion) performance further, we also report the
RMSE for the ALM (i.e. actual law of motion) for the observable variables. Notice that
these statistics are all based on in-sample forecasts. ALM forecast errors are also minimized
in the estimation procedure, so they provide a minimum bound against which the PLM per-
formance can be assessed. Furthermore, since the log marginal density is a function of the
ALM forecast errors, the RMSE statistics computed for alternative variables provide valuable
information about the sources of the improvement in the model fit based on the log marginal
density implied by introducing TS information into the PLM.
Table 4 has three panels. The first two show the RMSE statistics associated with the
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ALM and the PLM for the whole sample—together with the PLM statistics associated with
specific periods such as the Stagflation period (1966:1-1981:4), the disinflation period (1982:1-
2009:1), and the contraction periods as dated by the NBER business cycle committee— for
the DSGE model estimated under the two specifications of the PLM (equations (5) and (6)).
The first two panels also show the RMSE statistics for the two PLM specifications using
the first announcements (real-time data) instead of the actual (revised) data used in the
estimation procedure. To facilitate discussion, we also report the RMSE statistics obtained
from the estimation in the Slobodyan and Wouters (2012a) model (i.e. muting the TS part
of the model and removing the 1-year yield from the set of observables) in the third panel.
Several important conclusions emerge from Table 4. First, the RMSE statistics associated
with the ALM are lower for the learning specification that includes TS information across
all three real variables (i.e. the growth rates of consumption, investment and the real wage),
whereas the fit of the nominal variables is similar for the two AL specifications. A comparison
of these statistics with those reported in the third panel suggests that including the 1-year
yield as an observable variable and characterizing the 1-year yield in the model have only
a slight effect on the model fit across variables, with a small improvement in the fit of
consumption, investment, and inflation. Second, the RMSE statistics associated with the
PLM are also lower for the learning specification with TS information across all variables but
the 1-year yield. This outperformance by the PLM with TS is fairly robust across alternative
subsample periods: The accelerating inflation period (1966:1-1981:4), the downtrend inflation
period (1982:1-2009:1), and the periods of economic contraction. Interestingly, the PLM
associated with the SlW specification does a much better job in forecasting the 1-year yield
in the disinflation period than in the Stagflation period, but the opposite is true for the PLM
with TS information. Finally, the outperformance by the PLM with TS extends to the case
where the RMSE statistics are computed with real-time data as a reference instead of the
actual revised data used in the rest of the table. This suggests that by helping to improve
the forecasts of the first announcements of macroeconomic data, the yield curve (which is
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observed in real time) provides useful information for characterizing agents’ expectations
above and beyond that included in revised macroeconomic data.22
Table 4. RMSE comparison of PLM forecasts (1966:1-2009:1)
SlW-TS ∆c ∆inv ∆w π r r{4}
ALM 0.686 1.757 0.669 0.257 0.234 0.208
PLM 0.779 1.819 2.450 0.282 0.266 1.024
PLM (period 66:1-81:4) 0.823 2.145 2.682 0.379 0.365 0.484
PLM (period 82:1-09:1) 0.753 1.601 2.306 0.206 0.186 1.232
PLM (contraction periods) 1.353 2.889 2.181 0.305 0.391 0.411
PLM (real-time data) 0.775 4.320 – 0.325 – –
SlW
ALM 0.726 1.792 0.763 0.256 0.232 0.209
PLM 1.335 2.001 2.650 0.300 0.268 0.930
PLM (period 66:1-81:4) 1.227 2.201 2.601 0.369 0.354 1.439
PLM (period 82:1-09:1) 1.394 1.876 2.679 0.252 0.202 0.409
PLM (contraction periods) 1.827 3.121 2.099 0.297 0.358 0.439
PLM (real-time data) 1.335 4.478 – 0.348 – –
SlW with 7 observables
ALM 0.700 1.784 0.657 0.260 – –
PLM 0.705 1.812 0.673 0.281 – –
As pointed out by Slobodyan and Wouters (2012a), a sound performance by the expec-
tation models in terms of RMSE may help obtain a good overall fit of the model, but it
provides only indirect evidence on the empirical validity of those expectations. Next, we as-
sess the forecasting performance of the two PLM specifications studied in this paper against
22See Croushore (2011) for an outstanding review of the literature on real-time macroeconomic data and
the analysis of data revisions.
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the forecasts reported in the SPF. Specifically, the SPF reports private sector quarterly ex-
pectations on consumption, investment, GDP deflator inflation, and the short-term interest
rate (3-month TB yield) from late 1981 onward.23 Table 5 shows the RMSE comparison of
PLM forecasts with SPF data rather than the actual data used in the estimation procedure.
Clearly, the PLM forecasts including TS information do a much better job in matching the
expectations reported in the SPF across all forward variables than the PLM forecasts with-
out TS information. The rationale for this finding is that the SPF forecasts are based on
real-time data and the term spread information included in our PLM specification is also
available in real time, whereas the PLM forecasts under the SlW specification are based only
on ex-post revised data. The two pieces of real-time data (SPF and the yield curve) may
thus share important information available in real time. This finding is consistent with our
previous finding that TS information provides useful information for matching forecasts on
real-time macroeconomic data. These findings suggest that the use of SPF data may help to
discipline model expectations and improve the empirical fit of model expectations.
Table 5. RMSE comparison of PLM forecasts w.r.t. SPF data
Estimation period: 1966:1-2009:1
Comparison period : 1982:1-2009:1
∆c ∆inv π r
SlW-TS 0.363 1.240 0.442 1.007
SlW 1.358 2.106 1.206 1.580
The previous section looks at the implications for the parameters estimated of considering
SPF data in the estimation procedure, as described in the measurement equation (7), for the
23Although SPF expectations on inflation are available for 1968 onward, we decided to focus on the period
starting in the first quarter of 1982, when SPF expectations became available for all forward-looking variables
considered in this analysis. 1982:1 also roughly coincides with the time when the rate of inflation started to
go down. Furthermore, note that we consider the SPF forecasts of the 3-month TB rate as a good proxy of
the expectations of the federal funds rate because the actual time series of these two short-term rates are
almost perfectly correlated.
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short sample period characterized by the Great Moderation. Table 6 shows the corresponding
RMSE statistics of PLM forecasts obtained from the model estimated for the short sample
period. As a reference, the first panel in this table shows the RMSE statistics for the SPF
forecasts. The remaining two panels show the RMSE statistics for the two specifications of the
small forecasting models associated with the ALM and the PLM. The numbers in parentheses
below the RMSE statistics associated with the PLM forecasts indicate the percentage changes
in the corresponding RMSE-statistics when model expectations are disciplined with SPF data
(i.e. the percentage changes between the figures reported in the row labeled as “PLM (period
82:1-09:1)” in Table 4 and the corresponding figures in Table 6).
Table 6. RMSE comparison of PLM forecasts (1982:1-2009:1)
∆c ∆inv ∆w π r r{4}
SPF 0.589 1.699 – 0.229 0.161 –
SlW-TS
ALM 0.754 1.636 0.854 0.213 0.166 0.176
PLM 0.667 2.222 5.246 0.215 0.201 0.493
(-11%) (39%) (127%) (4%) (8%) (-60%)
SlW
ALM 0.667 1.517 1.017 0.246 0.155 0.154
PLM 0.660 2.044 3.628 0.217 0.263 0.455
(-53%) (9%) (35%) (-14%) (30%) (11%)
Interestingly, the forecasts based on the ALM from the two AL specifications are as good
as those reported in the SPF when SPF is considered in the set of observables. It is also
important to highlight that the AL specification with TS results in similar RMSE statistics
even when SPF is not used in the set of observables, as shown in Table 4. Interestingly,
including SPF in the estimation procedure results in a greater improvement in the forecasts
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for those variables that perform worst when SPF data is not used. Thus, the improvement
in the consumption growth forecast is greater for the SlW specification (a reduction in the
RMSE of 53%) than for the specification that includes TS information (a reduction of 11%).
Moreover, the performance of the PLM with TS information is lower for the rest of the
variables, except for the 1-year yield, when SPF is included in the set of observables.24 Thus,
including SPF data improves the PLM forecasts of the 1-year yield when the PLM considers
TS information (there is a 60% reduction in the RMSE). However, the opposite occurs (there
is an increase of 11%) for the forecasting models based on the SlW formulation.
In line with the results shown in Table 5 for the DSGE models estimated using the whole
sample period, Table 7 clearly shows that the PLM forecasts that include TS information
(SlW-TS) do a better job than the SlW specification in matching the expectations reported in
the SPF across most forward variables when the two AL specifications are estimated using the
shorter sample (1982:1-2009:1) and SPF data is included in the estimation procedure. The
figures in parentheses show the percentage changes in the RMSE-statistics when SPF data are
considered in the set of observables (i.e. the percentage changes between the figures reported
in Table 5 and the corresponding figures in Table 7). As expected, the forecasts from the two
PLM specifications become closer to the SPF forecasts when those forecasts are used in the
estimation procedure to discipline model expectations. Moreover, the improvement in the
two PLM specifications is inversely related to their relative ability to match SPF forecasts
when these forecasts are not used as observables in the estimation procedure (shown in
Table 5). Put differently, the need to discipline expectations is greatly reduced for the real
forward-looking variables (and to a lesser extent for the nominal variables) by including TS
information in the small forecasting models.
24This deterioration observed for some variables may be due to the fact that learning requires time and
information. That is, the RMSE-statistics computed for the period 1982:1-2009:1 using the whole sample
period in the estimation procedure (those reported in Table 4) may be somewhat superior to those RMSE-
statistics computed for the period 1982:1-2009:1 using the estimates for this shorter period (reported in Table
6) because the AL processes associated with the former take into account information predating 1982.
40
Table 7. RMSE comparison of PLM forecasts w.r.t. SPF data
Comparison period : 1982:1-2009:1 ∆c ∆inv π r
SlW-TS 0.301 1.024 0.179 0.293
(-17%) (-17%) (-60%) (-71%)
SlW 0.374 1.180 0.175 0.338
(-72%) (-44%) (-85%) (-79%)
5 Conclusions
This paper considers an estimated DSGE model with adaptive learning (AL) in which the
forecasting models of agents include term structure information. More precisely, we extend
the AL model of Slobodyan and Wouters (2012a) by introducing the term structure of interest
rates and then including term structure information observed in addition to the current and
lagged values of the forward-looking variables.
The estimation results show that including term structure information in the agents’ fore-
casting models results in an improvement in model fit. Moreover, the learning specification
augmented with term structure information improves the performance of AL in forecasting
actual revised macroeconomic data used in the estimation procedure as well as real-time (i.e.
the first announcements of) macroeconomic data. The latter finding suggests that the yield
curve contains important information available in real time, which is very useful in forecasting
aggregate variables above and beyond that provided by revised macroeconomic data. In line
with these findings, our estimation results also show that term structure information helps
AL expectations to match the forecasts of aggregate variables reported in the Survey of Pro-
fessional Forecasters, which are formed using information available in real time. Therefore,
term structure information further contributes to the empirical validity of AL.
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Learning with ELMo: inflation
expectations and monetary policy rules
1 Introduction
This paper studies the evolution of the inflation rate in the Euro Area (EA) since its creation
through a model with learning expectations in order the shape of inflation expectations,
showing that current inflation expectations are curbing the effects of the monetary policy
and that alternative rules such as asymmetric inflation targeting rules may become more
effective in escaping the zero lower bound once agents learn about them.
Most of the central banks of the advanced economies have received the institutional
mandate to maintain price stability, defined by a medium-term inflation target. Specifically,
in the case of the ECB, the mandate refers to keeping inflation rates close to, but below,
2% in the medium term. This objective is defined in terms of the Harmonised Index of
Consumer Prices (HICP), whose basket includes both the components that comprise the core
indicator (i.e. services and non-energy industrial goods) and energy and food. As a proxy
for the overall indicator, in the model presented in this article the analysis of inflation in the
medium term focuses on the core indicator. This has the disadvantage that the monetary
policy objective is not strictly represented, but it does facilitates the study of the role of
expectations in the deviation from the inflation objective, given that the trend of the core
indicator is comparatively less volatile.
The core inflation rate hovered between 1.5% and 2% on average from the time the
Euro came into being to the start of the global financial crisis. However, since then, and
particularly since 2014, the Euro Area core inflation rate has stood for a prolonged period
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below its previous figures. For the 2009-2019 period, the rate of change of core inflation
was 1.1%, 0.6 pp down on the phase prior to the global financial crisis. And further to the
outbreak of COVID-19, this disinflationary process has tended to become more acute. Such a
prolonged period of moderate inflation might be due either to temporary causes, albeit with
high persistence, or, alternatively, to more structural reasons. The first group of explanatory
factors, namely the temporary ones, would include elements such as the decline in energy
prices or the durable presence over this period of a high degree of slack both in the Euro Area
and global economies. The structural causes influencing long-term inflation movements relate
to changes in certain fundamentals of the economy. These include most notably sectoral
composition (with an increase in the weight of the services sector1), globalization (which
would give rise to a greater interconnectedness of inflation rates across different economies,
against the backdrop of the progressive incorporation into global trade of countries with lower
production costs) and changes in consumption patterns linked to population aging.
A stable path of inflation expectations consistent with the price stability objective smooths
monetary policy implementation, leading generally to a reduction in the volatility of the
economic cycle. However, the prolongation over time of the current low-inflation phase
has given rise to a debate on some deanchoring of inflation expectations in relation to the
central bank’s medium-term objective, and potential feedback between actual inflation and
expectations. As a result, the diminished pace of price changes would be exerting a downward
impact on economic agents’ inflation expectations, which would in turn affect actual inflation
in the same direction.
Most models traditionally used in monetary policy design start from the premise that
agents form expectations about the economy rationally.2 This hypothesis implies that, in the
shaping of their expectations, agents observe and process efficiently all available information.
1In particular, there is a growing body of evidence indicating that services prices are adjusting with less
frequency than in other sectors of the economy. See, for example, Bouakez, H., Cardia, E. and Ruge-Murcia,
F. (2014), and Álvarez et al. (2006).
2For example, some of the general equilibrium models that are commonly used by the New York Fed-
eral Reserve (FRBNY DSGE) or the European Central Bank (EAGLE), mainly for conducting simulation
exercises, are based on rational expectations.
48
In particular, agents are able to understand the nature of macroeconomic shocks and their
duration, and have the capacity to consistently incorporate news on monetary policy changes
or on expected developments in the economy into their expectations. However, in reality, it is
unlikely that agents are able to observe and process all available information.3 On numerous
occasions, the nature of shocks and their transmission channels are only imperfectly known
by agents and are difficult to identify. Alternatives to this hypothesis have been largely
debated in the literature.4 In this paper we explore the alternative of adaptive learning
expectations. This alternative assumes that agents’ expectations about future events are
partly and progressively updated with the information they receive about developments in the
main macroeconomic aggregates. It is further assumed that, when shaping their expectations,
agents use a limited amount of information, which they incorporate every period upon the
arrival of new information.
The model used in the paper is an Extended Learning Model (ELMo) version of Smets
and Wouters (SW, 2007) as in Aguilar and Vazquez (2019) estimated for the EA. The model
builds on the DSGE of Smets and Wouters (2007) under the assumption of adaptive learning
expectations and the incorporation of the term structure of interest rates through multiple
Euler equations associated with the different bond maturities. The extended model results in
multi-period-ahead expectations appearing in the different Euler equations. More precisely,
in this version of the model, agents form expectations on inflation (and consumption) from
one quarter up to five years. The model, estimated for the Euro Area as a whole for the
period from 1999 Q1 to 2019 Q4, combines macroeconomic information, (consumption and
inflation, among others) with financial information relating to the yield curve. The inclusion
of the yield curve enables financial-market information on the future course of the economy
3The empirical literature generally finds deviations in survey-based data from rational expectations. As
it is explained in Coibion et al. (2018), surveys of expectations reveal that there are biases across different
demographic groups, and that, for example, perceived inflation is affected by each agent’s consumption basket,
even if there is a commitment from a central bank.
4Since the pioneering publications by Marcet and Sargent (1989) and Evans and Honkapohja (2001) a
growing literature (including Preston, 2005; Milani, 2007, 2008, 2011; Eusepi and Preston, 2011; Slobodyan
and Wouters, 2012) , see the discussion in this regard in Aguilar and Vazquez (2019) and Vazquez and Aguilar
(2021).
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to be incorporated.5 Accordingly, this specification allows a more complete characterization
of expectations, by combining macroeconomic and financial information.
This paper focuses on the nature of the deviations from the inflation objective through
a learning scheme, this allows us to understand to what extent agents perceive current
deviations in the inflation rate as temporary or permanent and shed some light on the
(de)anchoring of inflation expectations in the EA. The recent conclusions in the literature
related to the EA point in two directions. On the one hand, Natoli and Sigalotti (2018) look
at co-movements between short- and long-term inflation expectations and find higher cor-
relation and negative shocks affecting short-run beliefs that impact long-run expectations,
suggesting a risk of de-anchoring in the long-run. On the other hand, Grishchenko et al
(2019) study the behavior of survey data for the US and EA in a dynamic factor model,
finding that the expectations remain anchored in both economies.
Another aspect relevant is the presence of the Effective Lower Bound (ELB) during a
prolonged period of low inflation and poor economic activity. The presence of the ELB
curves the ability of the central bank to implement its monetary policy and has the risk of
making low inflation episodes longer than in its absence. Alternatives to reduce the frequency
and duration of ELB episodes with respect to the current framework are now in the debate
in Bernanke (2017), and Mertens and Williams (2019) among others. These papers show
that alternatives to the current framework such as, Inflation Targeting (IT) and Price-level
Targeting (PLT), with the addition of an asymmetric version of each: Asymmetric Inflation
Targeting (AsIT) and Temporary Price-level Targeting (TPLT), reduce the presence of ELB
episodes, however, these results hinge on the assumption that the new rule is credible.
There is a bunch of papers studying the interaction between monetary policy and ex-
pectations under adaptive learning. Evans et al. (2008) argue that aggressive fiscal policy
measures may reduce the severity of liquidity traps. Evans and Honkapohja (2005) study
5In particular, the breakdown of nominal interest rates into the real, risk-free interest rate, inflation
expectations and a risk component enables the relationship between the implied yield on a bond and the
inflation rate to be exploited
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the ability of aggressive money supply rules to overcome ELB episodes. In Honkapohja and
Mitra (2020), price-level targeting is a potent tool by means of escaping liquidity traps, even
if the price-level targeting policy is imperfectly credible. Findings in Eusepi and Preston
(2011, 2018) suggest that active fiscal theory may help stabilize inflation in economies with
interest rate pegs and learning agents. Mertens and Ravn (2014) simulate an economy with
learning agents and a one-time ELB episode and show that the learning economy can escape
the ELB when expectations are not too pessimistic. In this matter this paper goes further
and studies the transitional effects of new policy rules to inflation expectations.
The results show that current expectations are shaping the effects of monetary policy. An
asymmetric inflation targeting rule, with a stronger response to inflation when it is below its
trend, seems to be a robust alternative that provides improvements over standard inflation
targeting, in terms of reducing the presence of ELB episodes, however there is one important
consideration: changing the rule is not very effective until agents have had time to learn about
it: in this model, the announcement of the new rule has no effect on agents’ expectations;
instead, they only update them as they see the central bank behaving in a different way and
learn about it, which requires time. This is very different from what we observe in models
with rational expectations, where the announcement perfectly anchors agents’ expectations
and has immediate effects in the economy.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the DSGE model with multi-
period expectations estimated for the EA. Section 3 studies the determinants of inflation
expectations in the EA since its creation. Section 4 analyses the transitional effects of alter-
natives to the current monetary policy framework, and section 5 concludes.
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2 A DSGE model with multi-period expectations for the
Euro Area
The model builds on the SW model and its AL extensions studied by Slobodyan and Wouters
(2012) and Aguilar and Vázquez (2019). This standard medium-scale estimated DSGE model
contains both nominal and real frictions affecting the choices of households and firms. The
assumption of adaptive learning implies that expectations are based on a limited information
set, meaning that agents use small forecasting models in forming their beliefs about future
realizations of forward-looking variables, in this case by using simple autoregressive models,
and that they adapt the coefficients of these forecasting models by a simple Kalman filter
updating procedure. In addition, the extension of the model to account for the term structure
of interest rates through the Euler equation results into a multi-period forecasting model,
with expectations about the key macroeconomic variables ranging from one quarter to five
years ahead.
More specifically, the expectations-formation mechanism of consumption, investment and
inflation in the model rests, in each period, on simple learning rules that take into consid-
eration the latest observed value and the size of the previous error forecasts to update the
learning coefficients. In the concrete case of inflation, the rule for updating expectations is
as follows:
Etπt+i = αi,t−1 + βπi,t−1πt−1,
where πt−1 is the deviation from target observed in the last quarter and βπi,t−1 measures
the degree of transmission of the observed deviation to expectations i (denoting a number)
quarters ahead. That is to say, under this rule agents incorporate the latest available infor-
mation on the deviation by inflation from target into their inflation expectations at different
horizons (up to 5 years) target. Moreover, this learning rule captures through αi,t−1 the pos-
sibility that deviations from the inflation objective may have long-lasting effects on inflation
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expectations over a forecast horizon of i quarters. Three possible values are considered in the
analysis for i: one, four and 20 quarters.
The greater the persistence of the deviations perceived by agents (πt−1) is, for a given
horizon i, the greaterβπi,t−1will be and, therefore, the higher the pass-through of these de-
viations to expectations. By way of illustration, a perceived value of βπi,t−1 equals to 0.5
means that agents expect the latest observed deviation from target to halve in i quarter.
Alternatively, a unit value for this coefficient would mean that agents expect the deviation
to hold in full over the next i quarters. Moreover, if agents were to believe that deviations
from target are permanent, which would be tantamount to a change in the inflation target,
then the coefficient αi,t−1would be observed to be other than zero.
Testing the anchoring of expectations
Under this simple expectations-formation framework, it is possible to estimate both learning
coefficients and, on the basis thereof, to analyze the degree of temporariness associated with
the deviations from inflation assigned by agents in constructing their expectations. Under a
scenario of fully credible monetary policy, agents would not perceive permanent deviations
from target αi,t−1 = 0 and temporary deviations would diminish over the course of the forecast
horizon (βπ1 > βπ4 > βπ20).
2.1 Estimation
The DSGEmodel is estimated for the sample period from 1999Q1:2019Q4, using the quarterly
series of the inflation rate, the short term interest rate, the log of hours worked, and the
quarterly log differences of real consumption, real investment, real wages, and real GDP with
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where l and dl represent the log and the log difference, respectively. γ = 100(γ − 1) is
the common quarterly trend growth rate for real GDP, real consumption, real investment,
and real wages. l̄, π, r and r{j} are the steady-state levels of hours worked, inflation, the
ECB interest rate, and the 1, 3, 5-year (ie. for j equal to 4, 12, 20 quarters) bond yields,
respectively.
We follow a Bayesian estimation procedure. First, the log posterior function is maximized
by combining prior information on the parameters with the likelihood of the data. The prior
assumptions are exactly the same as in Slobodyan and Wouters (2012). In addition, we
consider loose priors for the parameters characterizing both the 1, 3, 5-year yield dynamics
and the measurement error processes. The Metropolis-Hastings algorithm is used to generate
the posterior distribution and to compute the log density of the model. We report the key
parameter estimates in the model in Appendix A.1.
2.2 The evolution of expectations: cycle and trend
Figure 1 shows, for the different horizons analyzed, the estimated coefficients for the Euro
Area for the period 1999-2019. As might be expected, the value of the coefficients indicates
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that, except for some isolated period, the weight assigned by agents to past inflation in
their formation of expectations about price growth diminishes as the time horizon increases
(βπ1 > βπ4 > βπ20). The value of the coefficient at one quarter (βπ1) is close to unity,
suggesting that agents expect, at three months, that the deviations of inflation from target
will hold unchanged. Moreover, this coefficient has been highly stable since the start of
Economic and Monetary Union. In the case of medium-term expectations, i.e. four and 20
quarters ahead (βπ4 and βπ20), the estimates suggest that agents reduce, as the time horizon
increases, the weight they assign in their learning rule to the latest observed figure. The
course of both coefficients shows a positive correlation with the behavior of actual inflation,
indicating that, in periods with higher inflation rates (2001-2002 and 2007-2008), agents
estimate that deviations have a higher persistence. This finding suggests that prices show a
different degree of adjustment according to the level of the inflation rate through the cycle.6
In any event, according to the model, in the longer run inflation would return, in the absence
of fresh shocks, to the medium-term monetary policy objective, since the value estimated for
(αi,t−1) is very close to zero at any forecast horizon.7
6One possible explanation is the greater ease with which firms can, in periods of excess demand, raise
prices instead of increasing productive capacity. Conversely, in periods of low demand, they can opt to reduce
their capacity temporarily. See Bobeica and Sokol (2019).
7The chart depicts the coefficient estimated when i= 20 quarters. In practice, the estimated value when i
is equal to 1 or 4 is very similar, which can be explained by the fact that agents have the same information to
estimate the long-term deviation by inflation from target irrespective of the horizon i at which they formulate
their short or medium-term expectations.
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Figure 1. Inflation expectations coefficient’s evolution
2.3 International comparison
When comparing with the estimates from Aguilar and Vazquez (2019) for the United States
(US), see figure 2 below, the degree of persistence of inflation over the past 20 years on
average can be seen to be less in the US than in the Euro Area. That might be indicative of
less nominal rigidities in the US economy. A shock to inflation will be more or less persistent
depending on a series of factors which include, among others, the degree of wage inertia
(depending on the degree to which wages are linked to the overall price index), price-setting
rigidities and supply-side rigidities (which, in the model, are manifested via a limited capacity
to adjust the use of productive factors). In the case of the model estimated for the US, the
degree of wage indexation is comparatively lower, while the flexibility of prices is greater.
Consequently, inflation expectations in the US economy are less sensitive to past inflation,
mainly in the medium and long term. Specifically, the coefficients estimated for βπ4 and
βπ20(i.e. 1 and 5 years ahead) are approximately half those obtained for the Euro Area,
meaning that the deviation by expectations in the face of a shock is less both in terms of
level and duration.
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Figure 2. Sensitivity of inflation expectation to last value observed: EA vs US
The estimation results can be somewhat sensitive to the model used. One way of assessing
the estimates offered with is to compare the inflation expectations at the one-year forecast
horizon obtained from the model and those drawn from the ECB’s Survey of Professional
Forecasters (SPF). This quarterly survey reflects the expectations of participant respondents
– who are experts from financial and non-financial institutions alike in the Euro Area –
about inflation rates, GDP growth and Euro Area unemployment at different horizons. The
comparison between both sources of expectations shows that the dynamics captured in the
model are consistent with the SPF series (see Chart 3), which supports the empirical validity
of the estimates associated with the adaptive learning expectation formation.
Figure 3. ELMo vs SPF one-year-ahead inflation expectations in the EA
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3 Monetary policy under learning: Transitional effects
3.1 Transitional excercise
In this section we focus on the evaluation of alternative monetary policy rules, and how
the expectation formation of agents affects their performance, using the estimated version
of ELMo for the EA.8 We run a simulation exercise to see how often the economy hits the
ELB, and how costly this is, under different monetary policy rules. Because the model is
inherently time-varying, a nested Monte Carlo simulation is required.9
Starting from the current values of the α1,t=2018Q4 and β1,t=2018Q4 parameters in the ex-
pectation rules (the ones that come out of the estimation of the model, for the end of 2018),
we simulate 100 random paths of the economy, each with a horizon of 60 quarters; in these
scenarios, the agents are constantly updating the parameters of their expectation rules ac-
cording to the simulated evolution of the economy, which in turn depends on the specific
realizations of the shocks. For each simulated scenario, and for each quarter, we run a longer
simulation of million quarters without additional learning and see how often the economy hits
the ELB and how costly this is; for doing so we run the Monte Carlo simulation with the
learning parameters fixed with those corresponding to the learning process from the outer
Monte Carlo simulation.10
We run this exercise, with the same set of shocks, under three alternative strategies:
inflation targeting (IT, where the variable that enters the Taylor rule is the current year-on-
year rate of inflation), asymmetric inflation targeting (AsIT, which has the same Taylor rule
but with a higher response parameter when inflation is below its steady state level than when
8For this set of exercises, we use a version of the model with short-run expectations.
9In all simulations we use a weighted bootstrap from 1999-2018 to make sure the simulated evolution
has characteristics that match those of the observed data; the weights are introduced to make sure that the
simulations do not replicate too often an episode similar to the global financial crisis.
10A simulation with constant coefficients in the expectations equations does not intend to forecast how
the economy would behave in the future, but to explore the distribution of outcomes of the model given
the current coefficients. An alternative exercise where the inner Monte Carlo simulation also allows learning
would yield results that would be independent of the initial conditions, and would not be informative about
the transition dynamics of the economy when a new monetary policy rule is announced.
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it is above: 3 instead of 2), and Price-Level Targeting (PLT, where the variable that enters
the monetary policy rule is the deviation of the price-level from its long-run trend). Figure
4 shows the results. The left column of graphs corresponds to IT, the column on the center
to AsIT and the column on the right to PLT; the first row of graphs shows the percentage of
quarters at the ELB, the second row of graphs shows the average duration of ELB episodes,
and the last two rows correspond to the GDP and inflation losses in the presence of ELB
relative to a scenario where the ELB does not apply (i.e. when strongly negative interest
rates are allowed).
3.2 Results
The first finding is that current expectations (the estimated values of the α and β coefficients
for the end of 2018) are damaging: keeping the standard IT rule, simulating the model
forward and letting agents update their beliefs tends to have very positive effects on the
outcomes (the ELB becomes less common and the associated costs fall).The rationale for
these simulation results is that, at some point, positive shocks start to arrive, agents see
the economy recovering and the interest rate lifts off from the ELB (first row in figure 4),
they update the learning coefficients, anchoring them again, and the model reaches a state
in which the ELB is less common and less costly. Note that this is not because of the lift-off
of the interest rates after those positive shocks appear, but because of how that evolution
changes the parameters that govern the expectations of the agents.11
A second result is that changing the monetary policy rule is not very effective until agents
have had time to learn about it: in this model, the announcement of the new rule has no
instantaneous effect on agents’ expectations; instead, they only update them as the new
11Simulating one million quarters with random shocks, with the standard IT rule and the estimated ex-
pectations rules of 2018, the model stays at the ELB more than 60% of the time; but after five years of
random shocks and agents’ learning, a simulation of one million quarters with the same random shocks, with
the same IT rule but with updated expectations, makes the model stay at the ELB around 30% of the time
(the range goes from almost 0% to around 40%, depending on the simulated scenario for those 5 years of
learning: some scenarios lead to expectations rules that are still very damaging, whereas others end up with
very benign expectations rules).
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monetary policy changes the evolution of macroeconomic variables and agents learn about
it, which requires time. This is very different from what we observe in rational expectations
models, where the announcement perfectly anchors agents’ expectations and has immediate
effects in the economy.
Third, we observe that the asymmetric IT rule (AsIT) gives better results than the
standard IT rule (left panel vs center panel, or, for an easier comparison, solid line vs dotted
line in the left panel). The economy spends a bit less time in the ELB; the difference in
this metric is small due to this stronger downwards reaction of interest rates, the rule itself
makes them go faster towards the ELB. But, even with that, the GDP loss and inflation
loss associated to the ELB are significantly reduced. And most of this improvement comes
from the effect through the expectations of agents. Without learning (i.e. keeping the α
and β coefficients of the expectations rules at their estimated values for 2018) the results are
very similar with IT or AsIT, but when agents are allowed to adjust their beliefs, a faster
reduction of interest rates when negative shocks hit the economy affects the expectations of
agents, in a way that, even if the ELB is reached sooner, it also allows the economy to exit
faster from the ELB.
Finally, the results under the price-level targeting rule are somewhat complex (right col-
umn of graphs). The PLT rule is as effective as the AsIT rule at reducing the cost of the ELB
in terms of GDP and inflation, but the trade off generated by this make-up strategy is even
stronger than was the case for AsIT, and the time spent at the ELB actually increases with
respect to the results with IT or AsIT. When using PLT in ELMo, the ELB episodes become
much longer: if negative shocks hit the economy and bring interest rates to their lower bound,
the monetary policy rule keeps them there for a longer time (once inflation starts to rise,
interest rates remain low, until the price-level actually recovers). In a model with rational
expectations, the announcement that interest rates will remain lower for longer is effective at
avoiding the ELB in the first place, because it anchors very efficiently agent’s expectations.
But in ELMo the announcement does not generate this change automatically: agents only
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change their expectations once they see the monetary authorities acting in a different way,
which, in a ELB episode, happens when the economy starts to recover and they observe that
interest rates remaining at the ELB for a longer time. After the lift off, if the economy is hit
again by negative shocks relatively soon, agents will remember what happened the last time,
and a new ELB episode can be avoided, or if it happens, it can be shorter; but as time passes
and the economy evolves outside of the ELB, agents “forget” about their past experience at
the ELB (they keep learning about how the economy behaves outside the ELB) which means
that, if negative shocks strike again, a longer ELB episode may happen again. The results
balance the negative direct effect of the PLT rule (a lower for longer make-up strategy) with
the positive effect through agents’ expectations (which become better anchored after those
long ELB episodes); the overall result will depend on the parametrization used in the simu-
lation exercise. Further exploration is needed regarding the parameters of the PLT rule and
the speed at which agents learn and forget (e.g. faster learning makes the lower-for-longer
strategy start to work sooner, but also makes agents forget sooner about what happened in
previous ELB episodes).
In conclusion, these simulations showcase the importance of agents’ expectations in the
assessment of the effects of different monetary policy rules. An asymmetric inflation targeting
rule, with a stronger response to inflation while the inflation rate is below its steady state
level, seems to be a robust alternative that provides improvements over standard inflation
targeting and does not have the communication and lower-for-longer costs of a price-level
targeting strategy.
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Figure 4. Simulations transitional effects of new regimes
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4 Conclusions
This paper studies the anchoring of inflation expectations in the Euro Area in the context
of a model with adaptive learning expectations and studies the transitional effects of alter-
native make-up strategies to the current monetary policy regime. The approach used allows
a distinction to be drawn between which portion of the low inflation phenomenon might
be due to temporary factors and which might be considered permanent. The first result,
with respect to the evolution of inflation expectations in the Euro Area, suggest that agents
perceive the inflation rate’s recent departure from the monetary policy objective to be pre-
dominantly temporary, although the deviations from target are marked by a considerable
degree of persistence. The second result is that expectations expectations are an important
factor in shaping the effects of monetary policy. While current expectations are curbing
the effectiveness of monetary policy under the presence of the ELB, alternative rules such
asymmetric inflation targeting rules (that respond stronger when inflation is below trend)
are benefitial in escaping the ELB. In addition, this paper states the implications in the
transition from one monetary policy rule to another, showing that changing the rule is not
very effective until agents have had time to learn about it. The the announcement of the new
rule has the maximum effect agents observe their implementation and learn about it, which
requires time, which is very different from what the standard rational expectations models,
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Part III
The importance of data revisions
1 Introduction
The existence of data revision must be acknowledged when macroeconomic series are used
for business analysis. This chapter provides a detailed analysis of the statistical properties of
data revisions for the euro area and studies the appropriate modeling of real-time data and
its revision in DSGE models for business cycle analysis.
The main macroeconomic series are regularly revised relative to their real-time release to
incorporate new information that was not available at the time of the initial announcement
or to incorporate changes, such as in the definition of the indicator or the measurement of
the variable. A distinction between whether the data comprises initial releases and/or final
revised data must be taken into account by researchers when constructing datasets. If data
revisions are not well-behaved, meaning that they can be forecasted, researchers who ignore
this fact may suffer from a bias in their analysis. This chapter studies the properties of
real-time data and their revisions for the euro area and proposes a modeling framework to
incorporate this phenomenon into a DSGE model.
In one of the earliest studies of data revision properties, Mankiw, Runkle and Shapiro
(1984) focus on the predictability of data revisions. They analyze whether the preliminary
announcements of money stock are rational forecasts of the final announcements or obser-
vations containing a measurement error of the revised series. Mankiw and Shapiro (1986)
extend this study to the series of GNP.1 These two papers conclude that money stock revisions
are predictable but GNP revisions are not. This led to a primary classification of revisions
as adding news or reducing noise. Revisions add news when the initial announcement is an
optimal forecast of the final data, in which case they are orthogonal to initial data and there-
1Other relevant papers of the matter during that periods are Mork (1987, 1990)
66
fore unpredictable. Revisions reduce noise when the initial announcement is an estimate of
the final data with a measurement error. In that case the initial announcement is correlated
with the revision, thus, becoming predictable. Diebold and Rudebusch (1991) subsequently
highlight the importance of data revisions in macroeconomics. They show that the US index
of leading economic indicators does a fine job at predicting recessions ex-post but fails in
predicting future recessions. This is because the indicator is constructed to explain revised
past data, and thus ignores the fact that initial data releases may look very different once
they are revised.
The paper by Croushore and Stark (2001) increased the popularity of real-time data and
their revisions by providing a regularly updated real-time dataset of the main macroeconomic
variables. In particular, Croushore (2011) extensively reviews the literature and discusses
the data implications of real-time data for data revisions, forecasts, monetary policy analysis,
macroeconomic research, and current analysis of financial and business conditions. The use of
real-time macroeconomic datasets appears to become more important for policy institutions
with the development of new datasets by statistical agencies, such as the Federal Reserve
Bank of Philadelphia, the European Central Bank, and the OECD.
More recently, Aruoba (2008) defines the desirable statistical properties of data revisions,
namely i) the mean is expected to be zero; ii) small variance compared to that of the revised
variable; and iii) unpredictability. He finds that these properties are not satisfied in the
revisions of major macroeconomic variables in the United States, as they have a non zero
mean, their volatility is large compared to the final data, and they can be predicted using
the information set at the time of the initial announcement.2
Another relevant aspect is the impact of data revisions on the estimation of DSGE models,
which are now popular for macroeconomic analysis at central banks. Casares and Vázquez
(2016) introduce an extension of the Smets and Wouters DSGE model (2007) that includes
both real-time and revised data from the U.S. economy. Their estimates show a level of both
2A similar study is present in Faust et al (2005) for the G7 countries
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habit formation and price indexation which is lower than the standard model. They also
find that shocks in data revisions explain roughly 10% of output variability. This means that
omitting revisions may cause two problems: First, a bias in the parameter estimation; and
second, overestimation in the sources of business cycle variability.
This chapter contributes to the literature on data revisions by providing a detailed analysis
of the statistical properties of data revisions for the euro area and studying the appropriate
modeling of real-time data and its revision in DSGE modeling. More precisely, following
Casares and Vazquez (2016), the Smets and Wouters (2007) DSGE model is augmented
to include real-time data (by assuming that indexation rules and the monetary policy rule
are based on real-time data) and to incorporate data revisions. The aim is to pinpoint
the source of data revisions (whether they reduce noise or add news) and to assess their
macroeconomic implications. One of the main findings is that data revisions are not well-
behaved, i.e. they are correlated with initial announcements and show high volatility. These
empirical findings are confirmed in reduced-form regression analysis and in an estimated
DSGE model augmented with data revisions. These findings are in line with those of Casares
and Vázquez (2016) for the US. As a consequence, revisions become a major source in the
business cycle decomposition. In the case of the Euro Area they account for one-third of the
output variability, which is roughly three times the figure estimated for the US in Casares
and Vázquez (2016). This finding leads to the conclusion that DSGE models for business
cycle analysis which omit real-time data and data revisions may introduce a major source of
bias into the estimated variance decomposition and encourages further improvements in the
estimation of real-time data from the statistical agencies.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: Section Two introduces the concept of
revisions, describes their main properties, and proposes a specific framework for the inclusion
of data revisions in DSGE models. Section Three derives the real-time equations that enter
into the extended DSGE model. Section Four presents the data and estimation procedure




This section is divided into two parts and provides a rationale for the inclusion of data
revisions in macro models. The first part defines the concept of data revisions and the main
points to be considered when taking them into account, some of them often ignored in the
literature. The second part studies the statistical properties of data revisions in the euro
area and provides an empirical justification for their inclusion in DSGE models.
2.1 The concept of data revisions
Data revisions can be defined as the difference between the data initially announced and
the final revised data . In the case of the euro area, the first announcements of quarterly real
GDP, GPD deflator, and real consumption are generally released with a lag of one quarter,
while the final revised data are published between four and twelve quarters later.3 This






where yt refers to the final revised observation of GDP, yrt,t+1 represents the initial an-
nouncement with one quarter delay, and revyt,t+S captures the total value of revision after
t + S periods. A similar formula can be applied to the consumption and inflation revision
processes.
The vintage matters
The literature abstracts from the importance of the vintage in defining data revisions.4
3
Benchmark revisions may also occur during the revision process. They involve methodological changes,
such as the concepts included in the definition of the variable or the reference year in the series.
4The paper by Croushore and Stark (2001) is an exception. They discuss the election of data vintages,
but in the context of economic forecasting.
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However, authors such as Croushore and Stark (2001) are an exception in that they focus their
research on the choice of data vintages in the context of economic forecasting. The choice
of the vintage, however, becomes highly important when it comes to variables expressed
in growth rates, as revisions between vintages are a potential source of “noisy” revisions.
Table 2.A shows the different vintage publications of US GDP, which help to illustrate the
importance of the choice of vintage in computing output growth rates.
Table 2.A: GDP US
Period\Vintage 1990:Q2 1990:Q3 1990:Q4 1991:Q1
1990:Q1 4195.8 4150.6 4150.6 4150.6
1990:Q2 4163.2 4155.1 4155.1
1990:Q3 4173.6 4170
1990:Q4 4147.6
GDP: Billions of real Dollars
Depending on the choice of the vintage, output growth rates can be calculated in two
ways: Across different vintages or within the same vintage. In the first case, the growth
rate is obtained using the first quarterly data announcements from two consecutive vintages,
while in the second growth rates are computed using the first vintage in which both quarterly
variables are available. Formally, they can be expressed as follows:
g1 = (yrt+1,t+2/yrt,t+1 − 1)× 100,
g2 = (yrt+1,t+2/yrt,t+2 − 1)× 100.
Under the first option, g1, the growth rates are always computed using the first release,
while the second method, g2, may already incorporate a revision in the first observation.
However, using the same vintage avoids the impact of benchmark revisions between vintages.5
5 For our US sample data, 1983Q1:2008Q1, there are in all five benchmark revisions (1985:Q3, 1991:Q3,
1995:Q4, 1999:Q3 and 2003:Q4), while for the euro area there was one main benchmark revision in 2005.
Vázquez, María-Dolores, and Londoño (2012) adjust benchmark revisions by replacing them with the average
70
The quarterly growth rate of output in 1990Q2, depending on the method, would be either:
∆y1990Q2,g1 = (y
r
1990Q2,1990Q3/yr1990Q1,1990Q2 − 1)x100 = (4163.2/4195.8− 1)× 100 = −0.776%.
∆y1990Q2,g2 = (y
r
1990Q2,1990Q3/yr1990Q1,1990Q3 − 1)x100 = (4150.6/4163.2− 1)× 100 = 0.303%.
As illustrated in the example, different choices of vintage provide opposite-sign growth
rates. The size of the revisions are therefore directly affected by this choice, so this research
acknowledges the properties of data revisions under both alternatives.
2.2 Regression analysis of data revisions
This subsection studies the main statistical properties of data revisions in the euro area
to explain why they are relevant and should be included in macro models. The analysis is
divided into two parts: The first sets out the main descriptive statistics of data revisions
under both approaches (g1 and g2) of the quarterly growth rates of real GDP, consumption,
and inflation. The second part estimates the relationship between initial announcements and
data revisions to determine whether revisions add news to the initial announcement or reduce
errors, and provides an estimation of the process of data revisions.
Main descriptive statistics
According to Aruoba (2008), if data revisions are well-behaved they should have the
following properties: First, the mean is expected to be zero. This would imply that the
initial announcement is an unbiased estimate of the final revised value. Second, the variance
should be small when compared to that of the revised value. This is measured by the noise to
value of the two observations before and after. In this paper, benchmark revisions are managed by replacing
them with the value obtained from g2 , which greatly simplifies the procedure.
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signal ratio, which is the ratio between the standard deviation of the final revisions and the
final data. Finally, the revision should be uncorrelated with the initial announcement, i.e. it
should be unpredictable. Table 2.B shows the main descriptive statistics for data revisions
according to the list of interest for the quarterly growth rates (g1 and g2) of quarterly real
GDP, consumption and inflation.
Table 2.B Euro Area descriptive statistics of data revisions
Revision in g1 Revision in g2
GDP Consumption Inflation GDP Consumption Inflation
Mean 0.110 -0.111 -0.126 0.276 0.357 0.079
Absolute Mean 1.645 1.708 0.716 0.940 0.845 0.531
Median 0.172 -0.088 -0.088 0.478 0.413 0.095
Min -4.640 -7.440 -3.003 -2.978 -2.204 -1.637
Max 4.827 4.830 2.055 2.479 3.131 2.202
Std. D. Revision 2.126 2.273 0.957 1.153 1.032 0.686
Noise/Signal 1.602 1.658 0.761 0.720 0.622 0.901
Correlation with Initial -0.708 -0.712 -0.683 -0.376 -0.215 -0.414
Correlation with final 0.415 0.481 0.400 0.337 0.422 0.509
Correlation Initial-Final 0.348 0.272 0.395 0.744 0.793 0.571
The overall results suggest that revisions are not well-behaved. Data revisions of output,
consumption, and inflation have statistically non-zero means. The output and consumption
revisions also have a noise to signal ratio greater than one under both methods of compu-
tation. Finally, all variables show a relatively high level of (negative) correlation between
revisions and the initial release.6
Regarding the choice of vintage in terms of the statistical properties of the revisions, it can
be seen that when the second method of computing growth rates (i.e. using the same vintage)
6In the case of the US (see Appendix 1.C.2), the results are somewhat similar and the properties listed
by Aruoba (2008) are not satisfied either.
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is used in the case of the US (see Appendix 1.C.2) the results are somewhat similar; nor do
they satisfy the properties listed by Aruoba (2008). g2 reduces the variability of the revisions
(and thus, the noise to signal ratio) and reduces correlation with the initial announcement,
but the correlation with the final data remains low. In addition, the correlation between the
initial announcement and the final data is closer when growth rates are computed for the
same vintage. The fact that the mean is lower when g1 is used than when g2 is used is a
consequence of large error offsetting signs, so the absolute mean is smaller when g2 is used.
These results may prompt the reader to use growth rates computed for the same vintage, but
it must be realized that one revision may already be included in one of the observations used
to compute the growth rate. Concerning the use of either method in the literature, Croushore
and Stark (2001) rely on growth rates under the same vintage (although they mention the
possibility of using g1 too), Casares and Vázquez (2016) and Vázquez, Maria-Dolores and
Londoño (2012) use the g1 approach and make no specific mention of the method used in
Aruoba (2008).
Noise or news?
We formally test the hypothesis of whether revisions reduce noise or add news. They
reduce noise when the initial announcement is an early estimate of the revised variable
with a measurement error. This implies that the revision is uncorrelated with the final
value but correlated with the initial data release. By contrast, revisions add news when
the initial announcement is an efficient estimate of the revised variable and the revision is
correlated with the final data but uncorrelated with the initial announcement (as the revision
is unpredictable). Following Aruoba (2008), we test both hypotheses under the two methods
proposed for computing growth rates with real-time data:
-Noise: yrt,t+1 = α1 + β1yt + u1t
-News: yt = α2 + β2yrt,t+1 + u2t
where the first joint hypothesis α1 = 0, β1 = 1 tests the noise hypothesis and the second
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hypothesis α2 = 0, β2 = 1 tests the news hypothesis. If the first hypothesis is true, then the
initial announcement, yrt,t+1, is equal to the final release plus a measurement error, u1t , which
is uncorrelated with the final observation. So if yt−yrt,t+1 is replaced in equation 1, the result
is revyt,t+S = u
1
t , showing that revisions are an estimation error which is uncorrelated with the
final data. If, on the other hand, the second hypothesis is true, then the final observation is
equal to the initial announcement plus a measurement error, u2t . In this case it can be shown
that revisions are an estimation error which is uncorrelated with the initial announcement.
Table 2.C shows the results for GDP, consumption, and inflation revisions under both growth
rate computation methods for the euro area and the US.
Table 2.C Noise and News hypotheses
Revision in g1 Revision in g2
Euro Area US Euro Area US
Variable\Test Noise News Noise News Noise News Noise News
GDP 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.021 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗
Consumption 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.775 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗ 0.00∗∗
Inflation 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.876 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.346 0.00∗∗
Numbers in cells refer to p-value of each hypothesis.
Note:∗, ∗∗, represent the significance at the 1 and 5% levels.
The news hypothesis is rejected under both approaches for the euro area and the US.
Moreover, using g1 the noise test cannot be rejected. In combination with the first results,
this supports the idea that those data revisions are not well-behaved in the US. However,
using the same vintage to compute growth rates the noise hypothesis is rejected for GDP
and consumption. In the case of the euro area, the noise hypothesis is rejected under both
methods, so no clear conclusions can be obtained. One potential issue in these estimations is
the fact that the error term may contain a certain structure instead of being i.i.d., which may
bias the results. To overcome this, the following section presents a more in-depth analysis of
data revisions in the EA and the error term in the estimations.
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A regression analysis on data revisions
This section runs a pool of regressions to provide a sound characterization of data revi-
sions. We carry out a detailed set of regressions to ensure that the residuals are i.i.d. and
conclude by verifying whether data revisions depend on the initial announcements, past revi-
sions, and/or past errors. This analysis should also provide an empirical justification of how
data revisions might be included in macro models. We set out from two options : i) Revisions
depend only on the first announcement; ii) Revisions depend on the first announcement and
on past revisions. We then analyze the properties of the error term to ensure that regressions
are properly specified. More specifically, we take the following steps:
-For the estimation under the first alternative:
1) Estimate revisions depending on the initial announcement: revyt,t+S = αy1 + by1y
r
t,t+1 +
εy1t , where rev
y
t,t+S, is the estimation of the output revision without lagged revisions. αy1
captures the mean on the revisions and εyt corresponds to the error term. The coefficient
by1captures the correlation with the initial announcement of output. The subscript (1) refers
to type of revisions (in this case without lagged revisions).
2) The error εyt is computed from the residuals and regressed respect to its lagged values:
εy1t = µe1 +ρy1ε
y1
t−1. This step helps us to study the properties of the error, like the correlation
of the revisions with the residual term
3) The first regression is re-estimated including the lagged εy1t−1 errors generated in 2. In











-For the estimation under the second hypothesis we proceed likewise:








2) The new error term is evaluated εy2t = µe2 + ρy2ε
y2
t−1.














Table 2.E shows the results for data revision in the Euro Area.7 The estimation under
the first hypothesis shows that data revisions have an intercept (αy1) different from zero,
they are highly negatively correlated with initial announcements ( -0.72, -0.78, -0.68 in the
revisions of output, consumption and inflation, respectively) and show a high correlation
with the residual term (ρy1 , lies above 0.70 on average). Similar results are obtained if the
first residuals are included in the regression (step 3). These results support the idea of noise
in EA data revisions and provide a tentative structure for its inclusion in the medium-scale
DSGE model below.
As regards the second alternative, an important result is that the coefficients relating
revisions in period t to past revisions, δy, δc, δπ, are significant. The negative sign suggests
that high lagged revisions reduce the size of present revisions. Another important result is
that including past revisions reduces the correlation between data revisions and the resid-
ual component (approximately from 0.70 to 0.50) in the cases of output and consumption
revisions. These two results provide a solid justification for including past revisions in the
data revision process when modeled. However, although the coefficient of lagged revision is
significant (δy = −0.4), the estimation of the revision of inflation does not improve and there
is no clear advantage to including it.
3 Real-time data within a DSGE model
Introducing real-time data into the DSGE model relies on the assumption that the de-
cisions of economic agents are based on the initial releases of output, consumption, and
inflation variables. We formally introduce this assumption by using three channels present
in the Smets and Wouters (2007) model and in Casares and Vázquez (2016).8 First, it is
assumed that indexation rules which affect firms and unions are formed using the real-time
information set rather than final revised data on aggregate output and consumption. This
7Results for the US are also included in the Appendix (Table 2.E.1b).
8This can be extended to other DSGE models such as Christiano et al (2005) or more general macro
models like Fagan et al (2005).
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assumption is consistent with the fact that initial announcements are published with a one-
quarter delay. Secondly, the monetary authority’s decision is based on real-time as opposed
to final data. Finally, the external habit in consumption is assumed to depend on real-time
data on aggregate consumption. Under the representative agent model, the idea that the
aggregate level of consumption does not belong to the agent’s information set might sound
illogical to the reader, but there is an argument to support it: The external habit in con-
sumption plays the role of an externality in the model since it affects the agent’s utility but
is not controlled by the agent. Therefore, to keep the habit in consumption external, it seems
reasonable to assume that final revised aggregate consumption does not belong to the agent’s
information set. These assumptions affect the following structural equations: The New Key-
nesian Phillips Curve, wages, monetary policy rule, and the Euler-consumption equation.
This is detailed in the next section
3.1 An explicit specification of the revisions
Using the empirical analysis carried out in the previous section as a reference point, we
propose the corresponding equations for data revisions to be included in the DSGE model.
These equations permit a direct relationship between revisions and the initial announcements
for output, consumption, and inflation. In the cases of output and consumption they also




















where by, bc, bπ are the coefficients capturing the correlation between revisions and initial
9Note that the constant coefficient (αy) does not appear in the proposition for revisions in the DSGE
model (equations 4 to 6). This is because these equations are introduced in a log-linearized model that is
defined in deviations with respect to the steady-state. Although the econometrical approach is estimated
with revisions in the growth rate and in the DSGE revisions in the level are involved, they should manifest
the same properties. Since revisions in level do not affect the trend, they are expected to be stationary.
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announcements, δy and δc account for the importance of past revisions in the revisions of




t,t+S, are the error terms associated with




And likewise for consumption and inflation error term. The errors are assumed to follow






Finally, after some rearrangement, the precise characterization of revisions in output


































The innovation term in data revisions
The introduction of real-time variables is completed with the inclusion of three innovations
in their revision shocks. As previously indicated (see equations 6 and 7), the shocks follow
an AR(1) and they depend on the length of the revisions.10 Like in Casares and Vázquez
(2016), we allow shocks to contain an “innovation” component. Named as ηyt,t+S, η
c
t,t+S and
ηπt,t+S, they refer to output, consumption and inflation shock innovations respectively. As









10Aruoba (2008) uses S=12. Casares and Vázquez (2016) use S=3, 6 and 12 and find that their results
















Finally, for the rest of the shocks (please find the full set of equations in appendix),
we follow those indicated in Smets and Wouters (2007). As a result, the model shocks are
augmented up to a total of ten.
3.2 The new set of equations
The inclusion of past revisions in the definition of revisions for output and consumption
requires the derivation of a new monetary policy rule and the Euler equation. For the rest
of the extended model, NKPC, wage dynamics, and wage equation, the equations used are
those derived by Casares and Vázquez (2016). They can be found in the appendix. This
chapter uses the same notation as Smets and Wouters (2007). For a full description of the
notation please see the Appendix 3.
3.2.1 The Euler equation
We start with the first order conditions of the household with respect to their consumption








− Ξt = 0, (22)
As mentioned before, the external habit in consumption is now upon real-time announce-
ments. After replacing and log-linearizng it, we get the following equation






crt−1,t + (σc − 1)L1+σllt(i). (23)
Besides, from the log-linearized FOC of the demand for bonds we obtain
log Ξt = Et log Ξt+1 + (Rt − Etπt+1 + εbt). (24)
Taking (13) in t and t+1, so that we substitute log Ξt and log Ξt+1 in (14) and aggregating
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across agents, the expression below is achieved
ct = (h/γ) c
r






(Rt − Etπt+1 + εbt). (25)
The Etcrt,t+1 refers to the real-time announcement of aggregate consumption in t + 1





t,t+S (as shown in equation 1, but for consumption) and substituting revct,t+S






. Consequently we get













and isolating crt,t+1, an explicit term is obtained
crt,t+1 =






























(lt − Etlt+1)− 1−h/γσc (Rt − Etπt+1 + ε
b
t),
and grouping crt−1,tand isolating ct we get to final expression for this new Euler equation:
ct = c1
[
1 + δc(1 + bc)
























As a result, real-time data enters in the equation in the form of lagged values of external
consumption. Moreover, shocks in the revision process of consumption do play a role. Later
on, a specific structure will be provided to the shocks and its impact in the estimation
discussed.
3.2.2 Monetary policy rule
We use equation (1) to rewrite output in the monetary policy rule as we assume that
the monetary authority takes decisions based on the information available on output and
inflation. This implies that for lagged values of output, the observation that the authority
uses corresponds to the first announcement of aggregate output, which is published with a
one-quarter delay. Similar reasoning is used in Casares and Vázquez (2016); however, the
presence of lagged revisions affects the definition of revisions in output, and requires the
derivation of a new monetary policy rule. Starting from the Smets and Wouters (2007)














Including the equations for data revisions on output (7) and inflation (9) into the definition
of real-time data (1), we can express define yt and πt as follows:




















Placing the last two expressions for yt−1, yt−2, πt−1 into (19) we have the following ex-
pression













11Note that in this expression inflation and the output gap are lagged by one more period than in the




















































Finally, operating with the terms measuring the change in the real-time output gap, a
new monetary policy rule in real-time is obtained


























































+ εRt . (29)
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4 Data and estimation procedure
This section seeks to study the impact of real-time data and data revisions on DSGE
models through the three channels mentioned above. The sample period used for the euro
area is 1995Q1-2008Q1. The set of observable variables comprises quarterly series of the
inflation rate (expressed as the first difference in logs of the implicit GDP deflator), the ECB
interest rate, the log of employment, and the quarterly log differences of real consumption,
real investment, real wages, and GDP. In addition, for the extended model we incorporate
real-time series of quarterly inflation (expressed as the first difference in logs of the real-time
GDP deflator), and quarterly log differences of GDP and real consumption from the ECB
Real-Time Database.12 Variables displaying a long-run trend are expressed in log differences









































where l and dl respectively denote the log and the log difference. γ = 100(γ − 1) , is the
common quarterly trend growth rate for real GDP, consumption (also for real-time variables)
12Real time growth rates are computed using the g1 approach. The extended model is also estimated using
g2 but is not shown here due to space constraints. The overall result using the latter approach is similar, but
the identification of the revision processes becomes more sensitive.
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investment and wages, which are the variables presenting a long run trend. l̄, π, r are the
steady state the level of employment per capita, and the steady state values of inflation and
the short-term interest rate.
The approach used is a two-step Bayesian estimation procedure in Dynare. First, the log
posterior function is maximized by combining prior information on the parameters and the
likelihood of the data. Then the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm is implemented, which runs a
massive sequence of draws for all the possible realizations for each parameter to get a picture
of the subsequent distribution. For the SW model this algorithm is executed using 3 blocks
of 200,000 realizations each. The same is done for the extended model. The acceptance rates
for both models for the US and euro area are between 20-30%.
5 Estimation results
This section discusses the main results of the DSGE estimation. The first part argues the
main results in terms of parameter estimation for the euro area. The second provides the
main findings in terms of second moments and variance decomposition.
5.1 Parameter estimates
The baseline SW for the EA vs the US
Table 3.A reports the mean and the 5th and 95th percentiles obtained from the Metropolis-
Hastings estimation of both the extended and baseline model (without real-time data) pa-
rameters for the euro area. This subsection compares the baseline estimates (right-hand side
of the table) with those estimated for the US, as reported in Table 3.B. 3.B.13 The confidence
intervals of the main group of parameters overlap to a great extent with those for the US.
However, there are some noteworthy discrepancies. The degree of price and wage stickiness
(ξp,ξw) is slightly smaller (0.45 and 0.63 for the euro area against 0.66 and 0.70 for the US).
Regarding the indexation parameters (iw and ip), the price indexation is roughly the same
13We compare our results with those of Smets and Wouters (2007) since they are the main reference.
Nonetheless these comments apply to a large extent to the estimates reported in Casares and Vázquez (2016)
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(ip= 0.24), while the wage indexation coefficient is less than one-half of the US estimate
(0.21 versus 0.58). This makes the wage equation more forward-looking in the case of the
euro area. Another important difference lies in investment decisions, namely the elasticity of
capital utilization and the level of fixed costs (ψ and φ). The former, ψ, is significantly lower
(0.19 versus 0.54), while the latter is estimated to be higher (1.90 versus 1.60). With respect
to the parameter estimates in the policy rule, the smoothing parameter (ρ) and the coefficient
measuring the change in output gap (r4y) are both rather similar to the US. However, the
reaction to the inflation gap is smaller (1.72 versus 2.01) and the output gap is nearly zero.
Finally, in terms of structural shocks, the results suggest a greater persistence of spending
and risk premium shocks (ρb, ρR , 0.77 and 0.48 versus 0.22 and 0.15), while investment
adjustment and price and wage mark-up shocks (ρi, µp and µw) are less persistent.
The SW model with EA real-time data
The assumption that agent’s economic decisions are based on real-time data has two
important effects in the Euler equation. It reduces the importance of the habit in consumption
parameter (h drops from 0.68 to 0.4) and reduces the Frisch elasticity (σl increases from 1.09
to 3.07). In terms of nominal rigidities, it reduces the Calvo probability in wages (ξw drops
from 0.65 to 0.44) but increases wage indexation (iw increases from 0.21 to 0.45). Thus, wages
are updated more frequently but are more backward-looking. Concerning the new monetary
policy rule, the estimates show a similar reaction to real-time data as to the model with final
data. Regarding the estimates of the structural shocks, the model with real-time data shows
a smaller autocorrelation coefficient in the spending and risk premium shocks (ρg, ρR), and
a lower estimate in the moving-average component of both prices and wage mark-up shocks
(µp, µw).
The estimation of the data revision process supports the idea that data revisions are not
well-behaved. In the case of output and consumption the initial announcement anticipates
a future negative revision (by, bc being -0.15 and -0.13 respectively) and they are correlated
with past revisions. In the case of inflation the estimates show that the initial release antic-
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ipates an upward revision (bπ =2.2). The error component shows a high level of persistence
for all the variables (ρyr = 0.66, ρcr = 0.72, and ρπr = 0.94 ) and the estimated volatility of
the innovations (σyr, σcr and σπr) is on average twice as high as the rest of the shocks in the
model. These results are in line with the regression analysis for the revisions of output and
consumption. Both (reduced-form and structural) methodologies capture a negative corre-
lation with the initial release, the persistence in the error term, and the negative coefficient
associated with past revision. Concerning the inflation revision process, the estimations of
the DSGE and the regression model show opposite signs in the coefficient relating revisions
to the initial announcement, which might be due to the aforementioned differences between
the Bayesian structural econometric approach and the reduced-form OLS approach. In any
case, the overall conclusion (especially for output and consumption) remains robust, data
revisions are correlated with their initial announcement, and their errors show high variance
and persistence.
5.2 Second-moment statistics
Table 4 reports the main second-moment statistics: Standard deviation, contemporaneous
correlation with output growth, and first-order autocorrelation. These statistics relate to
actual and synthetic data from both the original and the extended SW models. In particular,
Panel A of Table 4 reproduces the second-moment statistics for real-time variables (yr, cr,
and πr) as well as their revisions (revry, revrc, and revrπ). The extended model fulfills a
moderate task when replicating them . First, serial autocorrelation is well approximated for
all variables. Second, the estimated volatility of revisions in output and inflation is practically
the same as in the actual data. However, the estimated variance of output and consumption
growth is three times higher than in the actual data. This higher volatility is due in principle
to the inclusion of new shocks (the specific impact is seen in subsections 5.3 and 5.4). Finally,
with respect to the correlation with final output growth, the real-time estimates of yr, cr, and
πr are very close to the true values, while their revisions are less closely correlated (about
half of the actual values).
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Table 4, Panel B shows the same statistics for the remaining endogenous variables (y,
c, i, w, l, R and π). The first conclusion that can be drawn is that the original model
does a better job in terms of volatility. This reinforces the idea that the extended model
with real-time data amplifies volatility. Concerning correlation with output, both models fit
the data reasonably well. Finally, the model performs moderately well in regard to serial
autocorrelation.
5.3 Variance decomposition
Table 5 shows the variance decomposition analysis for the EA baseline model and the
model with real-time. The variability of output growth is driven by demand-side shocks
in both models: the risk-premium shock (ηb), exogenous spending shock (ηg), investment
adjustment cost shock (ηi) and interest rate shock (ηR) account for more than half of the
total variability (61% in the original model and 57.2% in the extended model), with the
risk premium shock as the main source (between 30-40% for both). With respect to supply
shocks, the price mark-up shocks (ηp) are the main source of variation for wages, employment,
interest rate and inflation.
The introduction of data revision shocks in the extended model (ηry, ηrc and ηrπ) accounts
for roughly 30% of the variation in inflation and in consumption and output growth. In par-
ticular, shocks in the inflation revision process become the major source of business volatility
in the model. This result highlights the importance of acknowledging the significance of data
revisions.
6 Conclusions
This chapter provides a detailed analysis of the statistical properties of data revisions
for the EA. It also studies what type of modeling is appropriate for real-time data and its
revision in DSGE models.
From a practical standpoint, the statistical properties of data revisions are studied under
different approaches, leading to this first conclusion: Revisions depend on initial announce-
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ments and show high volatility, which suggests that they are not well-behaved. In addition,
a reduced-form regression analysis is carried out to propose an empirically based structure
of the data revision processes. This characterization of data revisions is introduced into the
Smets and Wouters (2007) DSGE model by assuming that the economic decisions of house-
holds, firms, and monetary authorities depend on real-time data. As a result, an extended
version of the model is derived, enabling us to estimate the implications of real-time data
and their revisions in the context of a DSGE model.
The estimates of the DSGE model corroborate that data revisions are correlated with
their first release, highly volatile, and highly autocorrelated. In the euro area, for instance,
a positive announcement of output and consumption is likely to lead to a negative future
revision. In the case of inflation, the correlation between the initial release and the first re-
vision is relatively close and positive. Furthermore, in terms of modeling, the incorporation
of real-time data and data revisions affects the DSGE model in three relevant aspects. First,
the estimated values of some of the main parameters vary, e.g. lower habit formation values
are found. Second, revision shocks become a significant source in the business cycle decom-
position. For instance, in the case of the euro area they account for up to one-third of output
variability. Finally, the introduction of new shocks increases the volatility of the variables
observed. In sum, these findings suggest that data revisions are not well-behaved, so DSGE
models omitting real-time data and data revisions might be ignoring important sources of
aggregate fluctuations. This work presents a way to accommodate this facts in business cycle
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Tables and figures
Table 1.C. US descriptive statistics.
Revision in g1 Revision in g2
GDP Consumption Inflation GDP Consumption Inflation
Mean 0.176 0.141 -0.045 0.330 0.261 0.087
Absolute Mean 1.629 1.464 0.761 1.278 1.151 0.582
Median -0.027 -0.024 0.033 0.325 0.256 0.204
Min -7.340 -4.605 -3.541 -4.238 -2.604 -1.661
Max 6.360 6.471 3.668 3.565 4.759 2.018
Std. D. Revision 2.201 1.970 1.017 1.559 1.451 0.716
Noise/Signal 0.967 0.965 1.036 0.686 0.708 0.748
Correlation with Initial -0.590 -0.695 -0.736 -0.176 -0.458 -0.556
Correlation with final 0.267 -0.003 -0.02 0.535 0.203 0.081
Correlation Initial-Final 0.623 0.720 0.695 0.737 0.776 0.783
Revisions of annualized quarterly growth series.
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Table 2.E.1 Euro Area regressions without past revisions
Regression revy
′













Coefficient Variable Coefficient Variable
GDP Consumption Inflation GDP Consumption Inflation
α1 0.40 0.355 0.30 α′1 0.40 0.34 0.30
0.07 0.077 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.05
b1 -0.70 -0.782 -0.68 b′1 -0.73 -0.78 -0.67
0.10 0.108 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.10
ρ1 0.06 -0.04 -0.21
0.14 0.14 0.14
R2 0.50 0.507 0.46 0.50 0.69 0.71
P-Value 0.00∗ 0.00∗ 0.00∗ 0.00∗ 0.00∗ 0.00∗
Corr with Res. 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.69 0.71
The p value refer to the model signifcance.∗, ∗∗, means that the model is significant at 1 or 5% respectively
The boxes with smaller numbers show the standard deviation
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Table 2.E.2. Euro Area regressions with pasts revisions
















Coefficient Variable Coefficient Variable
GDP Consumption Inflation GDP Consumption Inflation
α2 0.42 0.33 0.29 α′2 0.43 0.32 0.29
0.06 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05
b2 -0.75 -0.76 -0.66 b′2 -0.79 -0.80 -0.68
0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.09
δy -0.31 -0.31 -0.34 δy -0.52 -0.59 -0.42
0.09 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.12
ρ1 0.49 0.52 0.20
0.17 0.16 0.19
R2 0.60 0.61 0.57 0.67 0.68 0.57
P-Value 0.00∗ 0.00∗ 0.00∗ 0.00∗ 0.00∗ 0.00∗
Corr with Res. 0.62 0.69 0.65 0.57 0.55 0.65
The p value refer to the model signifcance.∗, ∗∗, means that the model is significant at 1 or 5% respectively
The boxes with smaller numbers show the standard deviation
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Table 2.E.1B. US regressions without past revisions
Regression revy
′













Coefficient Variable Coefficient Variable
GDP Consumption Inflation GDP Consumption Inflation
α1 0.41 0.43 0.33 α′1 0.41 0.43 0.34
0.06 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.03
b1 -0.47 -0.48 -0.52 b′1 -0.49 -0.49 -0.55
0.05 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.05
ρ1 -0.04 0.04 0.14
0.07 0.10 0.10
R2 0.35 0.48 0.54 0.37 0.48 0.54
P-Value 0.00∗ 0.00∗ 0.00∗ 0.00∗ 0.00∗ 0.00∗
Corr with Res. 0.80 0.71 0.67 0.79 0.71 0.67
The p value refer to the model signifcance. ∗, ∗∗, represent the significance at the 1 and 5% level.
The boxes with smaller numbers show the standard deviation
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Table 2.E.2B. US regressions with past revisions
















Coefficient Variable Coefficient Variable
GDP Consumption Inflation GDP Consumption Inflation
α2 0.41 0.43 0.33 α′2 0.46 0.43 0.38
0.06 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.05 0.03
b2 -0.48 -0.48 -0.52 b′2 -0.54 -0.49 -0.62
0.06 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.05
δy -0.15 -0.11 -0.06 δy -0.33 -0.22 -0.26
0.08 0.07 0.06 0.12 0.10 0.10
ρ1 0.31 0.25 0.48
0.18 0.15 0.15
R2 0.39 0.49 0.54 0.41 0.52 0.59
P-Value 0.00∗ 0.00∗ 0.00∗ 0.00∗ 0.00∗ 0.00∗
Corr with Res. 0.77 0.70 0.67 0.71 0.67 0.64
The p value refer to the model signifcance.∗, ∗∗, means that the model is significant at 1 or 5% respectively
The boxes with smaller numbers show the standard deviation
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Table 3.A.1 Priors and estimated posteriors of the structural parameters: Euro Area
Priors Posteriors
Extended model SW model
Distr Mean Std D. Mean 5% 95% Mean 5% 95%
ϕ Normal 4.00 1.50 7.22 5.24 9.11 6.00 4.22 7.80
h Beta 0.70 0.10 0.40 0.28 0.53 0.68 0.60 0.77
σc Normal 1.50 0.37 1.40 - - 1.40 - -
σl Normal 2.00 0.75 3.07 1.95 4.20 1.09 -0.01 2.2
ξp Beta 0.50 0.10 0.42 0.33 0.52 0.45 0.34 0.55
ξw Beta 0.50 0.10 0.44 0.32 0.56 0.63 0.53 0.75
ιw Beta 0.50 0.15 0.45 0.21 0.65 0.21 0.06 0.36
ιp Beta 0.50 0.15 0.17 0.04 0.29 0.24 0.17 0.43
ψ Beta 0.50 0.15 0.40 0.22 0.59 0.19 0.07 0.30
Φ Normal 1.25 0.12 1.84 1.69 2.01 1.90 1.79 2.01
rπ Normal 1.50 0.25 1.72 1.56 1.89 1.72 1.55 1.89
ρ Beta 0.75 0.10 0.81 0.75 0.87 0.79 0.74 0.85
ry Normal 0.12 0.05 0.06 -0.01 0.12 -0.01 -0.05 0.05
r∆y Normal 0.12 0.05 0.07 0.01 0.12 0.20 0.12 0.27
π Gamma 0.62 0.10 0.41 0.27 0.54 0.57 0.42 0.72
100(β−1−1) Gamma 0.25 0.10 0.33 0.16 0.50 0.30 0.17 0.43
l Normal 0.00 2.00 -1.60 -3.28 0.81 0.86 -2.15 3.20
100(γ − 1) Normal 0.40 0.10 0.4 - - 0.4 - -
α Normal 0.30 0.05 0.25 0.18 0.32 0.23 0.16 0.29
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Table 3.A.2 Priors and estimated posteriors of the shock processes: Euro Area
Priors Posteriors
Extended model SW model
Distr Mean Std D. Mean 5% 95% Mean 5% 95%
σa Invgamma 0.10 2.00 0.08 0.064 0.11 0.07 0.05 0.08
σb Invgamma 0.10 2.00 0.07 0.04 0.10 0.03 0.02 0.04
σg Invgamma 0.10 2.00 0.10 0.08 0.13 0.10 0.08 0.12
σi Invgamma 0.10 2.00 0.22 0.15 0.29 0.21 0.15 0.27
σR Invgamma 0.10 2.00 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.11
σp Invgamma 0.10 2.00 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.08
σw Invgamma 0.10 2.00 0.06 0.04 0.08 0.05 0.03 0.06
ρa Beta 0.50 0.20 0.97 0.94 0.99 0.96 088 0.99
ρb Beta 0.50 0.20 0.92 0.81 0.99 0.77 0.66 0.89
ρg Beta 0.50 0.20 0.82 0.74 0.90 0.92 0.86 0.98
ρi Beta 0.50 0.20 0.43 0.17 0.67 0.32 0.08 0.55
ρR Beta 0.50 0.20 0.39 0.23 0.54 0.48 0.33 0.62
ρp Beta 0.50 0.20 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.99
ρw Beta 0.50 0.20 0.96 0.93 0.99 0.91 0.86 0.96
µp Beta 0.50 0.20 0.30 0.07 0.51 0.54 0.24 0.73
µw Beta 0.50 0.20 0.39 0.16 0.61 0.51 0.25 0.76
ρga Beta 0.50 0.20 0.37 0.12 0.61 0.46 0.18 0.73
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Table 3.A.3 Priors and estimated posteriors of revision processes parameters: Euro Area
Priors Posteriors
Extended model SW model
Distr Mean Std D. Mean 5% 95% Mean 5% 95%
δy Normal 0.00 2.00 0.24 -0.14 0.67 - - -
δc Normal 0.00 2.00 -0.10 -0.36 0.14 - - -
by Normal 0.00 2.00 -0.15 -0.22 0.11 - - -
bπ Normal 0.00 2.00 2.20 1.35 3.02 - - -
bc Normal 0.00 2.00 -0.13 -0.14 -0.11 - - -
σyr Invgamma 0.10 2.00 0.21 0.17 0.25 - - -
σπr Invgamma 0.10 2.00 0.20 0.16 0.23 - - -
σcr Invgamma 0.10 2.00 0.25 0.20 0.30 - - -
ρyr Beta 0.50 0.20 0.66 0.33 0.95 - - -
ρπr Beta 0.50 0.20 0.94 0.89 0.98 - - -
ρcr Beta 0.50 0.20 0.72 0.56 0.89 - - -
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Table 3.B.1 Priors and estimated posteriors of the structural parameters: US
Priors Posteriors
Extended model SW model
Distr Mean Std D. Mean 5% 95% Mean 5% 95%
ϕ Normal 4.00 1.50 5.30 3.43 7.13 5.93 4.06 7.85
h Beta 0.70 0.10 0.13 0.10 0.16 0.57 0.45 0.67
σc Normal 1.50 0.37 1.33 1.05 1.59 1.07 0.76 1.35
σl Normal 2.00 0.75 1.79 0.79 2.75 1.95 0.99 2.85
ξp Beta 0.50 0.10 0.66 0.57 0.75 0.72 0.63 0.81
ξw Beta 0.50 0.10 0.51 0.37 0.65 0.59 0.45 0.72
ιw Beta 0.50 0.15 0.34 0.14 0.53 0.48 0.24 0.72
ιp Beta 0.50 0.15 0.09 0.03 0.15 0.33 0.14 0.51
ψ Beta 0.50 0.15 0.76 0.57 0.75 0.72 0.57 0.88
Φ Normal 1.25 0.12 1.43 1.30 1.57 1.48 1.34 1.61
rπ Normal 1.50 0.25 1.86 1.58 2.15 2.09 1.78 2.42
ρ Beta 0.75 0.10 0.84 0.81 0.87 0.83 0.80 0.87
ry Normal 0.12 0.05 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.08
r∆y Normal 0.12 0.05 0.09 0.07 0.11 0.18 0.13 0.22
π Gamma 0.62 0.10 0.67 0.53 0.80 0.70 0.57 0.85
100(β−1−1) Gamma 0.25 0.10 0.17 0.07 0.27 0.20 0.10 0.31
l Normal 0.00 2.00 -1.44 -3.75 0.86 0.18 −1.77 2.30
100(γ − 1) Normal 0.40 0.10 0.4 - - 0.39 0.35 0.43
α Normal 0.30 0.05 0.16 0.13 0.20 0.17 0.14 0.21
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Table 3.B.2 Priors and estimated posteriors of the shock processes: US
Priors Posteriors
Extended model SW model
Distr Mean Std D. Mean 5% 95% Mean 5% 95%
σa Invgamma 0.10 2.00 0.39 0.34 0.44 0.38 0.34 0.43
σb Invgamma 0.10 2.00 0.12 0.08 0.16 0.09 0.05 0.13
σg Invgamma 0.10 2.00 0.39 0.35 0.44 0.40 0.35 0.45
σi Invgamma 0.10 2.00 0.29 0.21 0.36 0.35 0.25 0.43
σR Invgamma 0.10 2.00 0.12 0.11 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.14
σp Invgamma 0.10 2.00 0.12 0.09 0.15 0.11 0.09 0.14
σw Invgamma 0.10 2.00 0.33 0.25 0.40 0.30 0.23 0.36
ρa Beta 0.50 0.20 0.91 0.87 0.95 0.92 0.87 0.97
ρb Beta 0.50 0.20 0.84 0.77 0.90 0.74 0.55 0.93
ρg Beta 0.50 0.20 0.98 0.96 0.99 0.97 0.96 0.99
ρi Beta 0.50 0.20 0.82 0.70 0.94 0.70 0.57 0.84
ρR Beta 0.50 0.20 0.09 0.01 0.16 0.27 0.13 0.40
ρp Beta 0.50 0.20 0.87 0.78 0.97 0.81 0.68 0.95
ρw Beta 0.50 0.20 0.97 0.94 0.99 0.96 0.93 0.99
µp Beta 0.50 0.20 0.56 0.35 0.78 0.60 0.38 0.82
µw Beta 0.50 0.20 0.64 0.44 0.87 0.66 0.46 0.86
ρga Beta 0.50 0.20 0.40 0.25 0.56 0.40 0.24 0.56
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Table 3.B.3 Priors and estimated posteriors of revision processes parameters: US
Priors Posteriors
Extended model SW model
Distr Mean Std D. Mean 5% 95% Mean 5% 95%
δy Normal 0.00 2.00 -0.10 -0.32 0.09 - - -
δc Normal 0.00 2.00 0 - - - - -
byy Normal 0.00 2.00 0.25 0.06 0.43 - - -
bππ Normal 0.00 2.00 -0.13 -0.25 -0.1 - - -
bcc Normal 0.00 2.00 0.19 0.10 0.28 - - -
σyr Invgamma 0.10 2.00 0.65 0.54 0.77 - - -
σπr Invgamma 0.10 2.00 0.23 0.19 0.26 - - -
σcr Invgamma 0.10 2.00 0.71 0.61 0.81 - - -
ρyr Beta 0.50 0.20 0.91 0.85 0.97 - - -
ρπr Beta 0.50 0.20 0.09 0.01 0.16 - - -
ρcr Beta 0.50 0.20 0.80 0.73 0.87 - - -
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Table 4. Second-moment statistics: Euro Area
Panel A ∆yr πr ∆cr rev∆y revπ rev∆c
Euro Area data:
Stand. deviation (%) 0.22 0.02 0.22 0.23 0.13 0.23
Correlation with ∆y 0.26 -0.056 0.19 0.63 -0.35 0.47
Autocorrelation 0.11 0.02 0.04 -0.05 0.25 -0.25
Extended model:
Stand. deviation (%) 0.64 0.04 0.86 0.24 0.37 0.28
(0.33,0.92) (0.01,0.07) (0.56,1.17) (0.20,0.28) (0.19,0.45) (0.23,0.32)
Correlation with ∆y 0.22 -0.03 0.24 0.31 -0.13 0.28
(0,0.37) (-0.10,0.01) (0,0.39) (0.05,0.55) (-0.21,-0.06) (0.14,0.4)
Autocorrelation 0.22 0.17 0.59 0.00 0.55 -0.13
(0,0.38) (0,0.32) (0.43,0.90) (-0.07,0.07) (0.23,0.83) (-0.19,-0.07)
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Table 4. (Continued)
Panel B ∆y ∆c ∆i ∆w l R π
Euro Area data:
Stand. deviation (%) 0.14 0.14 0.45 0.13 0.03 0.31 0.13
Correlation with ∆y 1 0.47 0.65 0.25 -0.02 -0.06 -0.32
Autocorrelation 0.50 0.01 -0.04 0.34 0.94 0.88 0.27
Extended:
Stand. deviation (%) 0.53 0.64 1.05 0.27 2.11 0.19 0.23
(0.28,0.75) (0.36,0.92) (0.47,1.62) (0.08,0.44) (0.47,3.70) (0.04,0.35) (0.10,0.37)
Correlation with ∆y 1 0.24 0.10 0.19 -0.07 -0.12 -0.11
(0,0.39) (0,0.22) (0,0.33) (-0.12,0) (-0.23,0) (-0.19,0)
Autocorrelation 0.23 0.18 0.30 0.41 0.71 0.69 0.64
(0,0.39) (0,0.34) (0,0.49) (0,0.60) (0,0.97) (0,0.95) (0,0.90)
SW model: ∆y ∆c ∆i ∆w l R π
Stand. deviation (%) 0.24 0.16 0.82 0.12 10.6 0.55 0.56
(0.14,0.34) (0.09,0.24) (0.43,1.23) (0.05,0.18) (1.21,20.3) (0.07,1.17 (0.08,1.16)
Correlation with ∆y 1 0.30 0.22 0.18 0 -0.08 -0.11
(0,0.66) (0,0.52) (0,0.45) (-0.02,0) (-0.23,0) (-0.32,0)
Autocorrelation 0.28 0.31 0.26 0.30 0.48 0.47 0.40
(0,0.63) (0,0.69) (0,0.61) (0,0.66) (0,0.99) (0,0.99) (0,0.99)
The parenthesis refer to 95% posterior confidence intervals for second-moment statistics
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Table 5. Variance decomposition (percent)
Extended model
Innovations ∆y ∆yr ∆c ∆cr ∆i ∆w l R π πr
Technology, ηa 1.3 1.2 1.2 0.9 0.2 0.5 0.7 1.5 0.6 0.4
Risk premium, ηb 32.8 30.5 37.3 29.5 7.8 22.4 8.3 53.5 25.2 17.2
Fiscal/Net exports, ηg 2.9 2.6 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.1 0.1
Investment adj. costs, ηi 11.9 11.0 0.0 0.5 75.6 3.3 4.8 7.4 3.2 2.1
Interest-rate, ηR 9.6 8.9 10.7 8.4 2.3 7.1 2.7 10.5 7.7 5.2
Wage-push, ηw 1.3 1.2 2.8 2.2 0.1 2.5 16.7 1.5 2.2 1.3
Price-push, ηp 8.7 8.1 9.7 7.7 0.1 37.5 53.8 19.0 30.9 21.2
Output revision, ηry 0.1 7.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1
Inflation revision, ηrπ 23.2 21.6 22.4 17.4 9.8 20.7 11.1 2.6 28.3 51.2
Consumption revision, ηrc 7.9 7.4 14.5 32.8 1.4 5.4 1.5 3.4 1.5 1.0
SW model
Innovations ∆y ∆yr ∆c ∆cr ∆i ∆w l R π πr
Technology, ηa 18.5 - 11.0 - 0.9 0.8 1.4 0.4 0.2 -
Risk premium, ηb 29.8 - 39.3 - 18.0 4.5 3.4 27.5 11.2 -
Fiscal/Net exports, ηg 7.1 - 0.5 - 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.7 -
Investment adj. costs, ηi 8.4 - 2.5 - 43.1 0.2 0.6 1.0 0.4 -
Interest-rate, ηR 16.1 - 18.9 - 11.9 2.8 2.4 2.8 8.2 -
Wage-push, ηw 10.9 - 11.5 - 16.0 18.4 11.6 3.4 8.5 -
Price-push, ηp 25.5 - 28.7 - 9.5 73.0 80.0 64.0 71.2 -
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Part IV
Borrower-based measures in a DSGE
model
1 Introduction
Macroprudential policies are an important toolkit of central banks nowadays to ensure fi-
nancial stability. Borrower-based macroprudential measures such as limits on loan-to-value
and loan-to-income have been found to be effective to influence credit standards and flows
through quantitative restrictions (see Claessens, Ghosh and Mihet (2014); BCBS (2010);
JMCB special issue (2015)). Not only do they affect the credit flow for house purchases,
but they are particularly important for financial stability by limiting risk-taking of borrowers
and lenders. Given their transmission through quantities and directly affecting borrowers,
these instruments are important to complement capital-based ones to counter the build-up
systemic risks. While cross-country studies indicate that loan-to-value, loan-to-income or
debt-servicing-to-income limits are effective to restrict credit, the individual measures differ
in their transmission to counter risks and the way they influence financial stability, to this
extent, this chapter uses a macro-financial DSGE model to address the feedback effects of
macroprudential policies in ensuring financial stability.
Limits on LTV ratios limit leverage relative to the value of the collateral and primarily
limit losses for the lender in the event of a borrower default. They thereby strengthen the
resilience of lenders, mostly banks. In countries where mortgage debt is non-recourse debt,
a tighter LTV ratio also reduces the incentives for strategic defaults and thereby reduces
probability of defaults, which is especially relevant when house price volatility is structurally
high and amortization rates are low. Strategic defaults have played an important role in the
With Stephan Fahr (ECB) and Francesco Sanna (ECB)
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US during the financial crisis but their occurrence is limited in Europe due to full recourse
loans. Caps on LTI and DSTI ratios, instead, focus more strongly on the affordability with
respect to the income of the borrower. In this way it counters more directly the risks related
to probabilities of default.
Borrower-based measures have been implemented in a number of countries and throughout
history. More recently the financial crisis has focused on their financial stability implications
and methodologies have been developed to quantify their impact, including DSGE models.
Bruneau et al. (2016), Chen and Columba (2016) or Walentin (2014) have analyzed the role
of borrower-based measures in the context of DSGE models.
The contribution of this paper is to quantitatively assess the transmission of limits to
household leverage, being it relative to the value of housing or to the wage income, and to
assess the role of shocks to income and to the value of housing for the macroeconomy under
differing LTV/LTI restrictions. The work is based on a model considering three layers of
default developed in the context of the Macro-prudential Research Network (MaRS) by Clerc
et al. (2015)1. The model considers loans to households and Non-Financial Corporations
(NFCs) and allows for defaults by banks, households and NFCs.
The modelling strategy to assess the impact of LTV and LTI limits consists in limiting
these ratios for outstanding loans beyond the values borrowers and banks would negotiate
among them. The assessment of the impact is intended to indicate the effects on real estate
markets and on financial stability. The conducted analysis provides at this stage less of an
assessment of the level of LTV and LTI limits from a normative perspective.
The quantitative implementation of the model uses data by the Eurosystem Household
Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS) in order, first, to calibrate the model and, second,
1The model in Clerc et al (2015) (the “3D” model) was developed in the context of the Macroprudential
Research Network (MaRS) of the European System of Central Banks to provide a decision-support framework
for the positive and normative analysis of macroprudential policy, with a specific focus on capital requirements.
Mendicino et al (2018) extend the original 3D model and calibrate it to Euro Area (EA) in order to provide
a quantitative assessment of increases in total and sectorial capital requirements in a stochastic environment.
Building on both Clerc et al. (2015) and Mendicino et al (2018), the 3D model has been operationalized to
all SSM countries in the context of the OMR task force.
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to relate the steady state implications to the policy instrument which affects the distribution
of the ratios. Indeed, as the policy instrument limits the distribution of LTV and LTI
ratios at loan origination, the HFCS provides a relationship between the changes in the
distribution of lending standards at origination and the average for outstanding loans. When
macroprudential policy tightens LTV/LTI limits it affects the right tail of a market-supported
LTV / LTI distribution at loan origination. The impact of such policy for the mean of the
distribution of credit standards depends on the size of the policy change and on the number
of affected individuals, i.e. the mass in the right tail of the distribution. The larger the
change and the larger the affected mass, the stronger the expected impact of the policy.
By combining the model with information on the distribution of loans in data, this chapter
tracks the impact of borrower-based measures from their impact on credit conditions at loan
origination, the policy variable, to the variable affecting the economy, outstanding loans, as
well as to the long-term macroeconomic effects on GDP, credit, real estate investment as well
as mortgage defaults and mortgage spreads. The results reveals that LTV and LTI limits can
have sizable effects on credit and leverage which have repercussions on real estate activity
and on the defaults of households. Overall, borrower-based measures are effective in reducing
credit flows and promoting household resilience through less mortgage defaults. The tighter
loan to value limit induces a shift in household expenditure away from housing expenditure,
resulting in a strong fall in housing investment, towards consumption, with an overall limit
effect on GDP.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces LTV and LTI limits into the
3D model, the workhorse model for capital-based macroprudential measures and covers the
steady state effects of the two measures. Section 3 it relates the credit ratios for outstand-
ing loans to the distributional changes at the right tail of distributions affected by policy
instruments.
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2 Macroprudential policies in the 3D model
The "3D" model in Clerc et al. (2015) introduces financial intermediation and default into
an otherwise standard dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model and provides
a clear rationale for banking regulation by introducing three types of distortions: limited
liability by banks, limited participation in equity markets and bank funding cost externalities
resulting in excessive risk-taking by banks. The model includes six types of representative
agents: borrowers, savers, entrepreneurs, banks, bankers, and the macroprudential authority.
However, because the focus of the model is on financial relations, the majority of the dynamics
is concentrated to the banking sector. Banks finance their loans by raising equity (from
bankers) and deposits (from savers). Deposits are formally insured by a deposit insurance
agency that is funded by lump-sum taxes paid by savers and borrowers. When banks default
(a non-linear event) depositors suffer some transaction costs despite the deposit insurance
scheme. This feature effectively links bank risk to bank’s funding cost
However, bank’s cost of funding is not related to bank’s individual risk taking. Instead,
it is dependent on the system-wide risk pattern. This is due to two factors. First, safety-net
guarantees insulate bank’s cost of deposits from the effect of their individual risk taking.
Second, the deposit premium is based on system-wide bank risk failure. This reduces the
incentive of any individual bank to limit leverage and failure risk because it will get no
funding cost premia (benefit) when depositors are assumed to be imperfectly informed.
Moreover, banks have an incentive to take as much risk as possible by leveraging up to the
regulatory limit. This excessive leverage has two counter-acting effects on their funding costs
in equilibrium. On one hand, default probability of banks increases, which exerts upward
pressure on bank’s funding costs. On the other, this results in higher bailout subsidy (and
taxes), which puts downward pressure on their funding costs. The net effect depends on which
of the two dominates. If bank failure risk is high, the first effect (higher deposit premium)
dominates, and the excessive leverage depresses economic activity. If overall bank risk is low,
excessive leverage will support economic activity. Economizing on expensive equity reduces
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overall bank funding costs, and higher leverage will increase economic activity.
Higher capital ratios tighten the supply of loans by reducing the incentives for banks to
take on excessive leverage. At the same time, higher capital ratios reduce the cost of uninsured
funds provided to banks, which in turn reduces the cost of credit. The final impact depends
on which of the two channels dominates. Moreover, the heterogeneity in households means
that there is a trade-off between the welfare of savers and borrowers. In the long run, savers
benefit from tighter capital regulation due to the reduced likelihood of bank failures which
implies safer bank deposits. Borrowers, meanwhile, lose out after a certain level of capital,
as this leads to a reduced supply of loans.
This paper extends the macroprudential toolkit in the 3D model to include limits on LTV
and LTI ratios as macroprudential policies to reduce household indebtedness and defaults.
In the original model, loans to households result as efficient private contract between the
household and the bank following the costly state verification by Bernanke, Gertler and
Gilchrist (1999). Banks grant loans and charge a spread over their own funding costs which
covers the losses from the expected default of households. A higher steady state rate of
defaults implies higher spreads charged by banks.
2.1 Borrower-based measures: Modelling strategy
The defaults are a direct consequence from uncertainty on the value of the collateral. Fur-
thermore, for given uncertainty a higher leverage ratio raises the risk of default by households.
Hence, a macroprudential policy which limits household leverage in mortgage contracts raises
the resilience of the household sector and reduces losses for banks. The model contains a
measure of household leverage (loan-to-value ratio of outstanding loans) which is central for
determining the mortgage spreads by banks. The equation for the loan contract in Clerc et

























where the Participation constraint imposes a certain return on equity ρt over the total
equity of the bank φHt bmt .
The return on equity is given by the left hand side of the equation, that takes into account
the leverage of the bank by the term (1 − ΓH(w̄t+1), where (ΓH(w̄t+1) is the share of bank
assets belonging to the depositors, Γmrepresents the share of housing value belonging to





is the rate of household defaults (the
superscript m refers to borrowers), x̃mt = xmt Rmt is the gross loan-to-value ratio (including the
interest rate) and w̄t+1is the cut-off threshold between default and non-default for mortgage





The equation contains thus an implicit measure of household leverage (loan-to-value)








where where, bmt is the mortgage debt, qht is the current value of the house and hmt is the
total stock of housing held by the borrower household.2.
The equation for the loan contract equates the expected returns to extending loans to
households, including losses for defaulting loans, to the applied interest rate spread. A higher
household leverage results in a higher probability of default by households and thus requires
2Note that, given the structure of the model, loans are rolled over every period, LTV at origination and
(outstanding) indexed LTV are hence equivalent, though when relating to the observed loan contracts, the
LTV ratio in the model should be interpreted as the ratio referring to the average of outstanding loans.
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a larger spread to compensate for the losses. Leverage enters in the budget constraint of the
household, thus affecting their default decision and determines the spread (and hence the
mortgage interest rates Rmt ) of loan contracts. In addition to the LTV ratio, an LTI ratio
can be constructed in the model. It combines the amount of mortgage loans and borrower’s







where bmt is the mortgage debt of the borrower, and the denominator stands for the
annual income (wht is the worker’s wage and lmt is the quarterly labour supply). In order
to compare to observable loan-to-income ratios we consider loans relative to annual income
(four quarters) by multiplying the denominator by four. Note that borrowers in the model
earn only labour income due to their time preference. Furthermore, the model does not
explicitly include taxation, which implies that net and gross income are identical and that
tax incentives related to mortgage debt are not explicitly considered. The calibration of the
model considers the loan supply equation and computes the endogenous loan amounts and
spreads. The counterfactual simulations which assess the impact of LTV or LTI restrictions
substitutes the loan supply equation by an exogenous loan amount. The reduction in LTV or
LTI ratios is implemented by reducing the exogenous mortgage loans until reaching the level
of the desired LTV decline. Since the new value is below the amount privately negotiated
by banks and households, it represents a constraint and is binding. The implementation
accounts for the fact that macroprudential policies can only tighten.
2.2 Calibration in steady state
The quantitative version of the 3D model is based on a calibration that matches first and
second key moments of individual-country macro-financial variables over the period 2001:1-
2014:4. In addition it uses the first wave from 2010 of the Household Finance and Consump-
tion Survey (HFCS) dataset to calibrate the share of borrowers, the wealth of borrowers and
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the LTV ratios. The original calibration of the model focused on macroeconomic and banking
variables such as total capital, the default rate of banks and the returns on their equity. In
order to account for household leverage in form of LTV ratios, the extended calibration strat-
egy incorporates loan-to-value ratios of outstanding loans as a moment to match in addition
to the variables in the original calibration. An alternative would be to use the LTI ratio as
explicit target. We instead use the LTI ratios as variables to validate the model and compare
the LTI ratio in the data to those obtained from the calibrated model.
The HFCS provides data on the financial situation of households in European countries.
It provides the loan and house value at origination and at the time of the survey, as well as
income at time of the interview. The data is used to construct the LTV ratio at the moment
of survey for the calibration of LTV ratios of outstanding loans. Using the HFCS as main
source for the LTV ratio is consistent with the data source of other two calibrated variables
in the model, namely the fraction of borrowers and housing wealth held by borrowers.
The LTV ratio for outstanding loans of borrowers is computed by dividing mortgage loans
for the household’s main residence (HMR ,HB170x) by the current housing value (HB0900)
multiplied by the share of home ownership (HB0500). The average across all borrowers
is computed by weighting by mortgage size (HB170x)3. In order to limit the influence of
outliers in the HFCS database, LTV ratios for individual borrowers are censored at 200%
LTV. We proceed similarly for LTV ratios of at origination. We use loans for the household’s
main residence HMR at origination (HB140x) and divide it by the respondent’s reply of the
house value at origination (HB0800) and the weighted country mean is obtained by using
the loan amount at origination. The LTV ratios for the 1st and 2nd wave are presented in
Table 1, whereby wave 1 of the HFCS dataset, conducted in 2010, exhibits a smaller country
coverage and wave 2 conducted in 2013 and 2014 provides a larger country coverage and
allows assessing evolution over time.
3An additional weighting by survey weights has also been considered, but has not been applied because,
first, it does not significantly alter the average value and, second, it is unclear to what degree the social
weights help in raising representativity of the borrower’s sample.
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The values used in the original model calibration slightly differ as the original calibration
was done based on a censoring of 150% instead of the 200% used in subsequent assessments. In
addition to the LTV ratios, Table 1 also documents loan-to-income (LTI) ratios at origination
and for outstanding mortgage loans. While the LTI ratio can be directly computed based
on the current outstanding loan for the household’s main residence HMR (HB170x) and
the current income (DI2000). For the LTI ratio at origination we use the loan amounts
at origination (HB140x) and deflate the current income using the aggregate consumption
deflator4. The LTI ratios are censored at 20 times annual incomes (additional series are
presented in the appendix).
As indicated, the model matches the LTV ratios relatively well and the model-implied
LTI ratios are in the range of those in the data, indicating the broad fit of the model to the
HFCS data. We do not expect that LTI ratios from the model and in data would fit perfectly
given that the model does not account for taxation nor for capital incomes by households.
Table 1: LTV and LTI ratios at origination and for outstanding mortgage loans
AT BE CY DE ES GR IT LU MT NL PT SI SK
LTV ratio at origination of mortgage loans (in %)
200% WM 80.7 93 86.2 83.3 87.2 87.4 83.4 - 90.8 103.8 93.7 71.9 84.8
LTV ratio of outstanding mortgage loans (in %)
200% WM 62.2 52.6 50.5 57.3 49.5 57.2 48.6 56.6 37.1 68.9 60.6 48.2 51.2
150% Model 61.7 52.4 49.5 56.9 58.4 56.7 48.4 55.3 35.1 68.2 59.8 59.5 49.5
LTI ratio of loans at origination of mortgage loans (in years of income)
20 WM 4.0 3.3 4.9 3.0 4.1 3.9 3.8 3.6 3.2 4.0 4.5 2.8 4.0
LTI ratio of outstanding loans (in years of income)
20 WM 3.5 3.1 4.5 2.5 3.7 3.3 3.0 3.2 2.7 3.9 4.0 1.9 3.5
As indicated, the model matches the LTV ratios relatively well and the model-implied
4This approach does not account for the income changes of each individual borrower between the origina-
tion of the loan and the current income. Still, an assessment by mean loans using national data for Portugal
delivered comparable amounts for mean incomes using income at origination and using deflated income.
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LTI ratios are in the range of those in the data, indicating the broad fit of the model to the
HFCS data. We do not expect that LTI ratios from the model and in data would fit perfectly
given that the model does not account for taxation nor for capital incomes by households.
2.3 Effects of varying household leverage in the 3D model
A 1 percentage point reduction in LTV ratios of outstanding loans
The credit standards in the 3D model are applied to the outstanding loans of the repre-
sentative household. This section assesses the long-term (steady state) effects of changes to
LTV and LTI ratios for outstanding loans. The next section sheds light on the implications
for changes in the LTV and LTI ratios on the tail of the distribution of originating loans
instruments. The quantification considered focuses on the implications when reducing LTV
ratios by 1 p.p. and LTI ratios by one tenth of annual income, i.e. by 10 p.p.. The regulatory
constraints are implied by substituting the endogenous loan contract between households and
banks through an exogenous credit amount that is lowered from the calibrated value up to
the point where it reaches the targeted LTV or LTI restriction
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Figure 1. Steady state impact of a reduction of LTV ratios of outstanding loans by 1
percentage point
Table 1. Steady state impact of a reduction of LTV ratios of outstanding loans by 1
percentage point. Max and min effects
LTV LTI GDP Consumption Mortgage Total Housing NFC Inv. Mortgage Mortgage
debt debt Inv. Inv. spreads defaults
(Outs.) (Outs.) level level level level level level bps %
p.p. p.p. % % % % % % bps p.p.
Min -1.00 -23.29 -0.29 0.06 -11.95 -6.50 -7.49 -0.34 -12.70 -0.37
Max -1.00 4.12 -0.05 0.23 -5.70 -2.27 -1.86 -0.09 -4.31 -0.13
The effects of a 1 percentage point reduction in LTV ratios of outstanding loans on eight
key model variables is depicted in Figure 1. The reduction in LTV ratios has overall a limited
effect on aggregate long-term GDP, ranging from 0.02 to 0.30% of national GDP levels. The
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size of the effects depends on the share of borrowers in the economy and the relative size of the
real estate construction sector as well as the initial LTV level. Indeed, an important element
explaining the muted response in GDP is the shift in aggregate expenditure away from
housing investment towards consumption. In addition, savers increase their expenditure of
housing as housing appears relatively cheaper. An economy with sizable housing investment
sees a relatively stronger fall in GDP, but also a stronger shift increase in consumption.
The LTV restrictions imply a reduction in aggregate debt levels by between 6 and 12%
across countries, whereas the effects on aggregate credit are between 2.5 and 7%. The reduced
leverage in the household sector implies also a reduction in the mortgage defaults because
lower LTV ratios imply that future variations in housing value trigger less of defaults. Default
rates decrease by between 0.03 up to 0.15 percentage points. Overall, banks face a reduction in
losses from defaults which allow banks to reduce spreads on mortgage loans. These reductions
amount to between 1 and 8 bps points.
A 10 percentage point reduction in LTI ratios of outstanding loans
An alternative to a reduction in LTV ratios consists in a decline in LTI limits. The decline
in LTI ratios is implemented by reducing credit amounts by as much is necessary to reduce
the imputed LTI ratios by the desired amounts, in line with the methodology for LTV ratios.
The effects of a 10 percentage point reduction in the LTI ratio is depicted in Figure 2 and
summarized in Table 2. A 10 percentage point reduction consists of a decline from e.g. 3.2
to 3.1 times the annual income.
The reduction in LTI ratio by the chosen value has, on average, a slightly larger effect
compared to the considered 1 p.p. reduction in the LTV ratio. Nevertheless, the relative
effects across countries depend on the relative initial indebtedness. The reduction in LTI
ratios implies limited effects on GDP, accompanied by a shift towards consumption and a
sizable fall in housing investment. Mortgage debt reduces by between 4 to 11% (17% for one
country) reduces mortgage default rates by between 0.1 to 0.8 percentage points and 2.6 p.p.
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to 26.9 p.p. for spreads.
Nevertheless, for some countries major quantitative differences exist. The reason for
the differences resides especially in the lower level of mortgage loans and lower housing
investment relative to GDP in these countries. This results in a higher percentage variation
when reducing LTI ratios in percentage points.
Figure 2. Steady state impact of a reduction of loan-to-income ratios of outstanding loans
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Table 2. Steady state impact of a reduction of LTI ratios of outstanding loans by 10
percentage points. Max and Min effects
LTV LTI GDP Consumption Mortgage Total Housing NFC Inv. Mortgage Mortgage
debt debt Inv. Inv. spreads defaults
(Outs.) (Outs.) level level level level level level bps %
p.p. p.p. % % % % % % bps p.p.
Min -3.0 -10.0 -0.2 0.1 -17.2 -5.5 -6.2 -0.2 -26.9 -0.8
Max -0.4 -10.0 -0.1 0.1 -4.3 -2.5 -1.5 -0.1 -2.7 -0.1
Caveats of the methodology
The simulations provided above are computations for steady state changes in LTV and LTI
limits. The choice to focus on steady state impacts is due to the fact that loans in the 3D
model are modeled as one-period loans with a roll-over of the entire loan mass every period.
As a result, a reduction in LTV or LTI ratios would affect the entire stock of loans, whereas
in reality, the policy instruments only affect the flow of loans. Furthermore, the model is set
up in real terms. It hence neglects the possibility that inflation could make nominal more
sustainable in times of high inflation. Likewise, it neglects the Fisherian debt deflation in
consumer goods, while it does account for the effects of declining housing value.
An additional limitation is the fact that LTV or LTI ratios are modeled as permanently
binding for the representative borrower. This does not allow relaxing credit conditions beyond
those prevailing in the market. It is likely that this is a condition for any macroprudential
policies. The default of mortgage loans in the 3D model occurs when loan size is larger than
the housing value of the borrower (house values are subject to i.i.d shocks). In a situation in
which house value shocks are the predominant source of defaults, such modelling is adequate.
Instead, when income shocks are the main source of uncertainty and defaults, the 3D model
only imperfectly captures the transmission of shocks. The shortcoming is conceptually more
relevant when considering limits of LTI ratios instead of LTV ratios.
Finally, as mentioned, the LTV and LTI limits are applied to the representative borrower
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on outstanding loans. In reality, the available policy instruments act only on parts of the
cross-sectional distribution of borrowers and only on the flow of lending. By acting on the
cross-sectional distribution, the policy instruments curtail loans from the most risky ones.
Instead, the model – by acting on the representative borrower – cannot overweight the riskier
loans. As a result, the declines in defaults are likely to be an underestimation of what is
achievable when reducing the high risk parts of the distribution.
In order to address the shortcoming, the next section provides the necessary steps to
relate the policy instruments to the model values.
3 Relating LTV and LTI policies at loan origination to
the dynamic model
The leverage considered in the 3D model relates to that of outstanding loans. Instead,
policymakers use instruments that limit credit standards in the flow of loans. This section
provides the information to relate credit standards at origination to those for outstanding
loans. In order to relate the policy instrument to the model-relevant credit standard requires
two steps:
1. Assessing the impact of the LTV or LTI policy limits at loan origination on the mean
of the LTV(LTI) distributions at origination. The policy instrument limits the right-hand
segment of the distribution and thereby reduces the mean LTV(LTI) ratio at origination.
2. Computing the effect on LTV (LTI) ratios of outstanding loans based on the mean
LTV(LTI) ratio at origination. The quantitative effect is obtained by using a long-run rela-
tionship between credit conditions at origination and those for outstanding loans, assuming
fixed-rate annuity mortgage contract.
119
3.1 LTV (LTI) limits and its effects on average credit standards at
loan origination
The first step in computing the effects of the policy instrument to the model requires assess-
ing the impact on the average credit condition at origination. The truncation/censoring of
the right-hand tail of the LTV or LTI distribution reduces the mean of the distribution. The
following assessment relies on two assumptions, discussed in more detail below. First, con-
strained borrowers are assumed to continue borrowing, but at a lower loan amount. Second,
in line with implemented policies, we assume that the LTV limits can be applied only to a
proportion of loans while a share of loans is exempted from the credit standard limit. In this
case the loans exceeding the credit limit are uniformly reduced in order for their share to
equate the imposed exemption share.
The upper hand panel of Figure 3 presents a stylized LTV distribution at loan origination.
By imposing an LTV limit at a threshold of e.g. 90% implies that all loans above that
threshold are curtailed. It is assumed that constrained borrowers continue borrowing, but
the amount they borrow is limited to the regulatory LTV limit, resulting in an increase in
loan amounts with an LTV ratio of 90%. This increase is identical to the originally affected
mass to the right of the limit (blue area). As a result of the restriction, borrowers are now
concentrated at the limited LTV ratio which is lower than their originally intended ratio and
the average LTV ratio at origination declines (from 62% to 61% in the diagram).
The lower panel of Figure 3 illustrates the effects on the distributional mean (vertical
axis) of imposing an LTV limit (horizontal axis)5. When reducing the LTV limit to e.g.
110% or 100%, the average mean LTV remains virtually unaffected (62%). This is because
the market-based distribution features only very few borrowers at LTV ratios above 100%,
given that the mass of the distribution is concentrated at LTV ratios around 75%. Reducing
the limit further to 80% results in an average of about 60% and an LTV limit of 70% would
imply an average LTV ratio of about 67%. The lower (tighter) the LTV limit, the more
5The example is based on a log-normal distribution.
120
borrowers are affected and the effects would eventually become proportional (a reduction of
the LTV limit by 1 p.p. would reduce the mean by 1 p.p.).
Figure 3. Stylized distribution of LTV ratios at origination and implication of LTV limits
on mean LTV at origination
Source: OMR Task Force calculation. Note: The stylized distribution is based on a log-normal distribu-
tion. Constrained borrowers are assumed to continue borrowing at the imposed regulatory LTV limit.
When setting limits on credit standard, policymakers have in practice also specified a
proportion to which the limit applies, indicating that only a share of mortgage loans are
required to comply with the limit whereas the remaining share of loans can exceed the limit.
For example, the 2016 review of the LTV limits in Ireland imposes a 90% LTV limit from
which 5% of loans to first time buyers and 20% to subsequent buyers are exempted. This
provides the policymakers two margins of adjustment: the limit on the credit standard and
the proportion to which the limit applies. It also implicitly offers a trade-off when adjusting
the macroprudential between the limit of the credit standards and the exemption share.
In order to assess the implication of the exemption shares requires assuming how credit
conditions behave for loans exceeding the limit. For modelling purposes, we assume that
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loans beyond the credit standard limit are reduced proportionally in order for their overall
amount to match the exemption share. Hence, if e.g. originally 30% of loans exceeded the
LTV limit considered by policymakers and the new exemption share amounts to 20%, we
would reduce all loans exceeding the limit proportionally so as to sum to 20% of the entire
distribution. This implies that one third of borrowers above the limit become constraint by
the LTV limit.
The choice of applying the restriction proportionally and relocating the constrained bor-
rowers to the limit has been influenced by two considerations. First, in the short-run con-
strained borrowers may decide to postpone an intended house purchase resulting in a drop-out
out of the market. As the simulation is conducted for the long-run steady state, the indi-
vidual delays would be compensated by new cohorts joining the housing market and result
in a generally lower indebtedness. As a result, the reduction in the loan flow may be ini-
tially larger, but would recover in the longer-run. Second, the specific distribution of loans
exempted from the limit is highly uncertain. The assumption that banks will grant the full
exemption share at conditions beyond the limit is unlikely. The results are therefore to be
seen as lower bound for the extension of credit.
Policymakers set the maximum values of macroprudential measures which banks have to
comply with. These are the maximum LTV ratio at origination (LTVOmax). In addition,
policymakers may exempt a share of loans from this limit, setting thereby an exemption
share (ES). The impact of exemption shares on the mean of the distribution is illustrated in
Figure A.1 in the appendix, which presents the average LTV ratio for different LTV limits
and different exemption shares in some euro area countries based on HFCS data.
We distinguish overall five exemption shares (ES). The lowest line captures a situation
where no exemption is granted to the imposed regulatory limit and all new loans with pre-
viously higher LTV ratios are constrained to the imposed LTV limit. This is the tightest
application of an LTV limit. The four other cases allow for exemptions to the regulatory
limit of 5, 10, 15 or 20% of total new loan production.
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To provide an example, a reduction of the LTV limit to 90% in Spain (see figure A.1 in
the appendix) implies a reduction in the mean LTV at origination by 12 p.p. (from 90%
to 78%). When imposing the same limit but allowing for an exemption of 10% yields a
reduction to an average LTV ratio by 8 p.p. (from 90% to 80%), indicating a looser stance.
The different countries illustrate varying degree of dispersion. For countries with highly
concentrated distributions, varying the exemption share does not imply major differences in
the average LTV for a given LTV limit. Instead, a wider distribution of LTV ratios makes the
average LTV ratio more dependent on the exemption share. In the extreme case where little
mass is widely distributed in a thin tail, the necessary policy change to reduce the average
LTV ratio is large. Instead, if a large mass is already accumulated close to the policy limit,
only a small change in the policy instrument would suffice to achieve the same change in the
average LTV.
When considering changes in the credit standards it is thus necessary to specify with
which exemption share the credit standard is changed as the effect of a change in the policy
limit would vary depending on the exempted right tail of the distribution. Conversely, if
the policy goal is to reduce the average lending standards by a specific amount, the share
of exempted loans matters in addition to the imposed LTV limit. Policymakers thus face
a trade-off to make between imposing higher constraints with a lower exemption share, or
instead imposing lower LTV limits but allowing for higher exemption shares.
Based on the available HFCS data it is possible to present the trade-off between LTV
limit and exemption share. Figure A.2 in the appendix illustrates iso-mean LTV lines by
combining the LTV limit (LTVOmax) on the horizontal axis to the exemption share (ES) on
the vertical axis. Using Spain again as example, the LTVO distribution has its mean at 87%,
as provided in the title. In addition, the percentiles of the full distribution with mean equal
to 87% are also shown. The 95th percentile is equivalent to a 5% exemption share. Hence,
the 80th percentile (20% exemption share) corresponds to an LTV ratio of 100% (illustrated
by a square). When considering a reduction of the average LTV ratio from 87% to e.g. 84%,
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and allowing for an exemption share of 10%, the LTV ratio would need to be reduced from
118% to 99%. Alternatively, the same mean LTV ratio can be obtained if the LTV limit is
reduced to 106% while exempting 5% of loans.
Figure A.3 and A.4 in the appendix provide the same concepts applied to LTI ratios based
on the HFCS wave 1 dataset. It appears that LTI ratios are more uniformly distributed and
unlike LTV ratios, the distributions do not exhibit a spike at a specific LTI value.
3.2 Linking credit standards at loan origination to outstanding loans
The previous section provided quantification between the cross-sectional distribution of lend-
ing standards at loan origination and the mean of the distribution. This section relates credit
conditions at origination to those for outstanding loans. This is necessary as the 3D model
operates with the average credit standard for outstanding loans and defaults on loans occur
on outstanding loans and may endanger financial stability of banks.
To relate the HFCS data to the model we follow two approaches. The first approach
computes the LTV ratio at origination and the same ratio for outstanding loans. The rel-
ative LTV ratio provides a conversation factor between LTV ratios at origination and for
outstanding loans. This quotient may be subject to sizeable measurement error, especially
because borrowers may over- or underestimate the value of their house when responding to
the survey. This is especially the case if the house has been purchased already many years
in the past and/or if the house owner is not actively following real estate developments. In
addition, the quotient is prone to biases in the recent loan dynamics. If, for instance, the
country has experienced a recent strong loan boom, the ratio would automatically be biased
upwards. Instead, if such a boom had taken place in a more distant past, the quotient would
have been lower. This makes this specific quotient excessively volatile across countries. We
therefore also compute a second quotient based on more theoretical relationships.
The second approach exploits the annuity formula for loans to establish a correspondence
between the loan size at origination and the average outstanding loan over the lifetime of the
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mortgage. Assuming that borrowers contract multi-annual mortgage loans with fixed annuity
payments results in a clear relationship between interest rates, maturity, loan at origination
and outstanding loan amounts. The quotient of LTV at origination and the average LTV
for outstanding loans is determined by the annual interest rate and the overall maturity. A
longer maturity implies higher interest payments and hence higher overall steady state debt
levels and LTV ratios by borrowers. We further assume that underlying the mortgage market
structure is a constant turnover of cohorts - with a constant inflow of new borrowers equated
by a constant outflow of borrowers who have fully reimbursed their loans.
Table 3 provides an overview of the different LTV ratios and the quotients between LTVs
at origination and for outstanding loans. For each HFCS wave, the first line is the average
LTV at origination based on the HFCS data, the second line is the LTV ratio based on
outstanding loans. The second block uses loan maturity, interest rates and the LTV ratios
for outstanding loans in order to compute the implied LTVO ratio and ultimately the quotient
between LTVs at origination and for outstanding loans. Overall, the first wave confirms the
strong variation of quotients across euro area countries, whereas the ratios based on the
annuity formula imply a ratio of 1.7 to 1.85. The 2nd wave overall confirms these ratios
(1.69-1.87, see the last row of Table 3), but the empirical ones are generally lower, partly
driven by the strong house price falls in some crisis during the crisis aftermath and due to the
increased new recent loan contracts in other countries. For the calibration of the 3D model
we use the average of the empirical quotients across all countries and those obtained from
the annuity calculations which results in a factor of 1.71.
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Table 3. LTV at origination and outstanding
AT BE CY DE ES GR IT LU MT NL PT SI SK
Empirical ratio (LTV origination/LTV outstanding)
Ratio 1.38 1.77 1.71 1.45 1.76 1.53 1.72 1.57 2.45 1.51 1.55 1.49 1.65
Other moments
Maturity, years 23 19 20 13 22 20 18 21 25 28 26 14 19
Interest rate % 3.2 3.8 4.9 4.4 5.1 5.3 3.5 2.4 4.2 4.7 2.5 5.2 5.7
Implied LTV % 45 52 50 46 52 51 46 48 53 63 52 40 50
Implied ratio 1.79 1.79 1.73 1.83 1.69 1.71 1.82 1.85 1.71 1.65 1.81 1.79 1.70
Source: Source: Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS) 1st wave, OMR Task Force cal-
culation. Note: LTVO: LTV at origination. The average LTV ratio is the weighted mean. * The implied
LTV ratio for outstanding loans is obtained by assuming a fixed-annuity loan contract over the average ma-
turity of the loan contract assuming constant nominal interest rates over the entire horizon. The approach
is consistent with a steady state view for the structural model, but does not account of past episodes of loan
creation.
3.3 Policy simulation
Two policy simulations are considered. The first one reduces LTV limits at loan origination by
5 p.p. from 90% to 85% with an exemption share of 10%. The second simulation reduces LTI
limits at loan origination by 50 p.p. from 500% to 450% of annual income, while exempting
10% of loans from this limit.
3.3.1 Reductions of LTV limits at origination
A standard calibration is considered in order to provide a reference quantification across
countries. Such a calibration does not capture the relevant structural differences between
countries and, when considering country-specific assessments would require to be recalibrated
with caution to account for the national specification. The impact of such a standardized
measure should therefore not be seen as a proposal for an implementation of borrower-based
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measures. This would require more specific assumptions based on information from each
country. Nevertheless, the policy exercise provides a cross-country benchmark based on a
standardized policy simulation and illustrates the importance of national real estate markets.
The general equilibrium long-term costs and benefits of the LTV limit are depicted in
Table 4a and 4b. A reduction of the LTV limit from 90 to 85% (with 10% exemption share)
results in a 1.2 – 3.2 p.p. decline in average LTV at origination and a long-term decline
of 0.7 – 1.9 p.p. for the average LTV ratio of outstanding loans across euro area countries.
The policy would imply only limited effects on GDP, but reduces long-term mortgage debt
by 5.1 - 19.5% and reduces housing investment by between 1.7 and 14.2%, revealing strong
adjustments in especially highly leveraged countries with large shares of borrowers. The
tighter LTV limit induces a shift in household expenditure away from housing expenditure,
resulting in a strong fall in housing investment, towards consumption6. The size of the fall in
housing investment depends on the fraction of borrowers in the economy and on the original
LTV ratio.
On the side of benefits, and importantly for financial stability, the resulting lower leverage
in the household sector reduces mortgage defaults by between 0.2 and 0.4 p.p. compared with
the historical averages used in the calibration. The lower default rates, in turn, allow banks to
reduce spreads on mortgage loans by between 7.6 to 15.1 bps. Overall, the macroprudential
instrument is effective in reducing credit flows and promoting household resilience through
less mortgage defaults.
An assessment of possible over- and underestimation based on this methodology are in
order. On the one hand, the effect on mortgage defaults may be overestimated in countries in
which it has been found that housing valuations and housing defaults are poorly correlated.
This would especially be the case in countries for which full recourse mortgages is a sufficiently
strong deterrent to defaults. On the other hand, the effects may be underestimated, especially
in those countries where high LTV loans exhibit much higher probabilities of default. In these
6The model is a closed economy model and does therefore not allow to consider adjustments in the balance
of payments.
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cases a reduction in the LTV limits implicitly targets the riskiest borrowers and would make
them more resilient. In countries where default rates are strongly correlated with LTV ratios
a smaller adjustment in the LTV limits would suffice to reduce aggregate defaults and bolster
financial stability.
Especially as regards the substitution of housing expenditure with NFC investment and
consumption, the macroeconomic effects may be overstated. The model assumes a realloca-
tion between sectors which is only affected in the short-run by capital adjustment costs, but
is not affected by skill mismatch of workers.
Table 4a. Impact of a 5 p.p. reduction in LTV ratios (from 95 to 90%) at loan origination
LTV Policy Min Max
LTV limit p.p. -5 -5
Average LTVO p.p. -3.2 -1.2
Average LTV ratio (outstanding) p.p. -1.9 -0.7
Average LTI (outstanding) p.p. -39.9 -2.9
GDP level % -0.55 -0.04
Consumption level % 0.05 0.42
Mortgage debt level % -19.5 -5.1
Total debt level % -12.2 -1.6
Housing inv. level % -14.1 -1.9
NFC inv. level % -0.6 -0.1
Mortgage spread bps -15.1 -7.6
Mortgage default rate p.p. -0.4 -0.2
Source: OMR Task Force calculations based on HFCS data (1st wave) and on 3D model. Note: The
reported changes are in percent of the long-term steady state value of the variable. Euro area countries
not participating in the first wave of the HFCS are not considered. For some few small and open euro area
countries, the model is assessed not to perform adequately and results are therefore excluded from this range.
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Table 4b Impact of a 5 p.p. reduction in LTV at origination on macro-financial variables
AT BE CY DE ES GR IT NL PT SI
4mean LTV at origin p.p. -1.8 -2.5 -1.8 -1.7 -2.3 -2.4 -2.1 -3.2 -2.9 -1.2
4mean ILTV outst. p.p. -1.0 -1.5 -1.1 -1.0 -1.3 -1.4 -1.2 -1.9 -1.7 -0.7
GDP level % -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.5 -0.2 0.0
Housing invest. % -4.9 -2.9 -4.5 -5.1 -3.5 -4.2 -2.2 -14.1 -7.0 -1.9
Mortgage debt % -12.3 -8.5 -8.0 -9.9 -8.8 -11.4 -9.5 -19.5 -17.1 -5.1
Mortgage spreads bps -10.7 -7.6 -9.6 -12.5 -10.9 -15.1 -14.2 -8.1 -10.9 -7.9
Mortgage default rate p.p. -0.3 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.3 -0.4 -0.4 -0.2 -0.3 -0.2
Source: OMR Task Force calculations based on HFCS data (1st wave) and on 3D model.
Figure 4. Impact of a 5 p.p. reduction in LTV at origination on macro-financial variables
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3.3.2 Reductions of LTI limits at origination
Similarly to the policy simulations on LTV limits, we consider tighter limits on LTI ratios
at loan origination to increase household resilience. The main policy exercise is a decline in
LTI limits at loan origination by 50 p.p. from 5 to 4.5 times annual income, while exempting
10% of loans from this limit. The methodology first assesses the impact of the LTI constraint
on the mean LTI conditions at loan origination. In a second step it converts the LTI ratio at
loan origination into a ratio for outstanding loans. The results for such policy are presented
in Table 5a and 5b and Figure 5.
Table 5a. Impact on macro-financial variables of a 50 p.p. reduction in LTI at origination
from 5 to 4.5 times annual income
LTI Policy Min Max
LTV limit p.p. -0.5 -0.5
Average LTIO p.p. 23.8 -4.39
Average LTV ratio (outstanding) p.p. -0.9 -0.4
Average LTI (outstanding) p.p. -13.9 -2.6
GDP level % -0.26 -0.03
Consumption level % 0.04 0.2
Mortgage debt level % -9.1 -2.3
Total debt level % -5.7 -1.4
Housing inv. level % -6.6 -0.8
NFC inv. level % -0.3 -0.1
Mortgage spread bps -10.4 -2.1
Mortgage default rate p.p. -0.3 -0.1
Source: OMR Task Force calculations based on HFCS data (1st wave) and on 3D model. Note: The
reported changes are in percent of the calibrated steady state value of the variable. The value reported for
mortgage default ratios and mortgage spreads are the calibrated value and the value after implementation,
for ease of interpretation. A reduction in the LTI ratio from 5 to 4.5 has no impact in Germany and Slovenia,
because the mass of the distribution is concentrated at lower LTI ratios.
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Table 5b. Impact of a 50 p.p. reduction in LTI at origination on macro-financial variables
AT BE CY DE ES GR IT NL PT SI
4mean LTV at origin p.p. -12.9 -4.4 -20.9 - -18.4 -15.8 -18.5 -23.9 -20.9 -
4mean ILTV outst. p.p. -7.5 -2.6 -12.2 - -10.7 -9.3 -10.8 -14.0 -12.2 -
GDP level % -0.1 0.0 -0.2 - -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.1 -
Housing invest. % -2.1 -0.8 -3.5 - -2.5 -2.5 -1.7 -6.6 -2.2 -
Mortgage debt % -5.3 -2.3 -6.2 - -6.4 -6.9 -7.0 -9.1 -5.3 -
Mortgage spreads bps -4.4 -2.1 -7.3 - -8.0 -9.1 -10.4 -3.7 -3.2 -
Mortgage default rate p.p. -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 - -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.1 -0.1 -
Note: The reported changes are in percent of the calibrated steady state value of the variable. The
value reported for mortgage default ratios and mortgage spreads are the calibrated value and the value after
implementation, for ease of interpretation. A reduction in the LTI ratio from 5 to 4.5 has no impact in
Germany and Slovenia, because the mass of the distribution is concentrated at lower LTI ratios.
Figure 5. Impact of a 50 p.p. reduction in LTI at origination on macro-financial variables
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4 Conclusions
This chapter uses a macro-financial DSGE model where excessive risk behavior harms the
economy introducing an incentive for macroprudential regulation, in which the benefit of
tightening policies in terms of reducing risks may be offset by a reduction in bank activity
and leading to a depression in the economy, providing a good set-up for analyzing the macroe-
conomic benefits of macroprudential regulation. By combining the model with information
on the distribution of loans in data, this paper tracks the impact of borrower-based measures
from their impact on credit conditions at loan origination, the policy variable, to the variable
affecting the economy, outstanding loans, as well as to the long-term macroeconomic effects
on GDP, credit, real estate investment as well as mortgage defaults and mortgage spreads.
The assessment reveals that borrower-based measures have sizable effects on credit amounts
and can reduce long-run defaults. For instance, a reduction of the loan to value limit from
90 to 85% leads to reductions of aggregate credit are between 2.5 and 7%, the resulting
lower leverage in the household sector reduces mortgage defaults by between 0.2 and 0.4 p.p.
compared with the historical averages used in the calibration. The lower default rates, in
turn, allow banks to reduce spreads on mortgage loans by between 7.6 to 15.1 bps. Overall,
the macroprudential instrument is effective in reducing credit flows and promoting household
resilience through less mortgage defaults. The tighter loan to value limit induces a shift in
household expenditure away from housing expenditure, resulting in a strong fall in housing
investment, towards consumption, with an overall limit effect on GDP.
The assessment reveals that borrower-based measures have sizeable effects on credit
amounts and can reduce long-run defaults. Its assessment is nevertheless limited to long-
term effects, given limitation in the relatively simple way the real estate market is modeled.
It opens up extension possibilities to develop additional models to shed light on the detailed
working of the real estate market by focusing on additional sources of shocks and the role
played by expectations of house prices.
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Supplementary appendix (Not intended for publication)
Log-linearized dynamic equations
In addition to equation (3) with n = 4 characterizing the 1-year bond yield, respectively, the set of
the remaining log-linearized dynamic equations characterizing the estimated DSGE model are the
following:
• Aggregate resource constraint:
yt = cyct + iyit + zyzt + ε
g
t , (30)
where cy = CY = 1−gy− iy, iy =
I
Y = (γ − 1 + δ)
K
Y , and zy = r
k K
Y are steady-state ratios. As
in Smets and Wouters (2007), the depreciation rate and the exogenous spending-GDP ratio
are fixed in the estimation procedure at δ = 0.025 and gy = 0.18.
• Consumption equation:





rt − Etπt+1 + εbt
]
, (31)
where : xt = ct− x1ct−1, x1 = hγ , h denotes the habit formation parameter and γ denotes the
balanced-growth rate.
• Investment equation:
it = i1it−1 + (1− i1)Etit+1 + i2qt + εit, (32)
where i1 = 11+β , and i2 =
1
(1+β)γ2ϕ
with β = βγ(1−σc).
• Arbitrage condition (value of capital, qt):
qt = q1Etqt+1 + (1− q1)Etrkt+1 − (Rt − Etπt+1) + c−13 ε
b
t , (33)
where q1 = βγ−1(1− δ) = (1−δ)(rk+1−δ) .
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• Log-linearized aggregate production function:
yt = Φ (αk
s
t + (1− α)lt + εat ) , (34)
where Φ = 1 + φY = 1 +
Steady-state fixed cost
Y and α is the capital-share in the production
function.7
• Effective capital (with one period time-to-build):





where z1 = 1−ψψ .
• Capital accumulation equation:
kt = k1kt−1 + (1− k1)it + k2εit, (37)








mct = (1− α)wt + αrkt − εat . (38)
• New-Keynesian Phillips curve (price inflation dynamics):















of the curvature of the Kimball goods market aggregator, included in the definition of A, is
fixed in the estimation procedure at εp = 10 as in Smets and Wouters (2007).
7From the zero profit condition in steady-state, it should be noticed that φp also represents the
value of the steady-state price mark-up.
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• Optimal demand for capital by firms:
− (kst − lt) + wt = rkt . (40)
• Wage markup equation:




1−h/γ (ct − (h/γ) ct−1)
)
. (41)
• Real wage dynamic equation:
wt = w1wt−1 + (1− w1) (Etwt+1 + Etπt+1)− w2πt + w3πt−1 − w4µwt + εwt . (42)
where w1 = 11+β , w2 =
1+βιw
1+β







with the curvature of
the Kimball labor aggregator fixed at εw = 10.0 and a steady-state wage mark-up fixed at
φw = 1.5 as in Smets and Wouters (2007).
The rest of this appendix shows the complete set of parameter estimates for the two main
specifications considered in the paper in Table A.1. Similarly, Table A.2 shows the parameter
estimates considering SPF data in the set of observables.
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Table A.1.A: Priors and estimated posteriors of the structural parameters
Priors Posteriors
Sample period: 1965:4-2009:1 SlW-TS model SlW model
Distr Mean Std D. Mean 5% 95% Mean 5% 95%
log data density -1057.596 -1092.600
ϕ: cost of adjusting capital Normal 4.00 1.50 4.616 4.579 4.646 7.975 7.945 8.014
h: habit formation Beta 0.70 0.10 0.759 0.749 0.788 0.851 0.842 0.878
σl : Frisch elasticity Normal 2.00 0.75 1.767 1.745 1.798 1.744 1.744 1.801
ξp: price Calvo probability Beta 0.50 0.10 0.563 0.550 0.583 0.472 0.459 0.487
ξw : wage Calvo probability Beta 0.50 0.10 0.464 0.456 0.482 0.565 0.549 0.589
ιw : wage indexation Beta 0.50 0.15 0.470 0.401 0.486 0.185 0.107 0.229
ιp: price indexation Beta 0.50 0.15 0.378 0.325 0.401 0.178 0.151 0.192
ψ: capital utilization adjusting cost Beta 0.50 0.15 0.092 0.085 0.100 0.151 0.149 0.180
Φ : steady state price mark-up Normal 1.25 0.12 1.493 1.442 1.500 1.622 1.549 1.608
rπ : policy rule inflation Normal 1.50 0.25 1.617 1.570 1.643 1.662 1.656 1.683
ρr : policy rule smoothing Beta 0.75 0.10 0.886 0.878 0.896 0.884 0.881 0.907
ry : policy rule output gap Normal 0.12 0.05 0.038 0.032 0.047 0.075 0.065 0.095
r∆y : policy rule output gap growth Normal 0.12 0.05 0.144 0.132 0.154 0.122 0.104 0.131
rsp: policy rule term spread Normal 0.12 0.05 0.140 0.118 0.159 0.255 0.218 0.284
π: steady-state inflation Gamma 0.62 0.10 0.658 0.628 0.706 0.610 0.589 0.656
100(β−1 − 1): steady-state rate of disc. Gamma 0.25 0.10 0.174 0.151 0.182 0.324 0.234 0.324
l: steady-state labor Normal 0.00 2.00 -0.449 -0.509 -0.396 1.903 1.792 1.903
r{4}: steady-state 1-year yield Normal 0.00 2.00 0.844 0.844 0.967 2.397 2.381 2.463
γ: one plus st-state rate of output growth Normal 0.40 0.10 0.393 0.386 0.403 0.408 0.405 0.415
α: capital share Normal 0.30 0.05 0.169 0.153 0.188 0.182 0.152 0.200
ρ: learning parameter Beta 0.50 0.28 0.992 0.988 0.997 0.998 0.996 1.000
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Table A.1.B: Priors and estimated posteriors of the structural shock process parameters
Priors Posterior
SlW-TS model SlW model
Distr Mean Std D. Mean 5% 95% Mean 5% 95%
σa: Std. dev. productivity innovation Invgamma 0.10 2.00 0.480 0.454 0.501 0.488 0.476 0.525
σb: Std. dev. risk premium innovation Invgamma 0.10 2.00 0.396 0.312 0.446 0.669 0.669 0.749
σg : Std. dev. exogenous spending innovation Invgamma 0.10 2.00 0.483 0.452 0.520 0.508 0.506 0.534
σi: Std. dev. investment innovation Invgamma 0.10 2.00 0.433 0.426 0.446 0.604 0.599 0.692
σr : Std. dev. monetary policy innovation Invgamma 0.10 2.00 0.230 0.218 0.248 0.216 0.199 0.226
σp: Std. dev. price mark-up innovation Invgamma 0.10 2.00 0.134 0.121 0.140 0.170 0.164 0.197
σw : Std. dev. wage mark-up innovation Invgamma 0.10 2.00 0.693 0.677 0.742 0.801 0.788 0.859
σ
{4}
η : Std. dev. 1-year yield innovation Invgamma 0.10 2.00 0.170 0.161 0.170 0.167 0.156 0.182
ρa: Autoregressive coef. productivity shock Beta 0.50 0.20 0.954 0.946 0.965 0.911 0.895 0.926
ρb: Autoregressive coef. risk-premium shock Beta 0.50 0.20 0.439 0.384 0.471 0.544 0.498 0.544
ρg : Autoregressive coef. exog. spending shock Beta 0.50 0.20 0.988 0.983 0.993 0.964 0.960 0.979
ρi: Autoregressive coef. investment shock Beta 0.50 0.20 0.526 0.503 0.539 0.685 0.668 0.696
ρr : Autoregressive coef. monetary policy shock Beta 0.50 0.20 0.057 0.014 0.061 0.046 0.030 0.053
ρp: Autoregressive coef. price markup shock Beta 0.50 0.20 0.875 0.875 0.910 0.880 0.860 0.904
ρw : Autoregressive coef. wage markup shock Beta 0.50 0.20 0.918 0.909 0.928 0.838 0.827 0.853
ρtp: Autoregressive coef. 1-yr term premium shock Beta 0.50 0.20 0.973 0.965 0.980 0.961 0.949 0.969
µp: MA coef. price markup shock Beta 0.50 0.20 0.693 0.676 0.711 0.608 0.591 0.635
µw : MA coef. wage markup shock Beta 0.50 0.20 0.477 0.454 0.517 0.325 0.309 0.368
ρga: Interact. betw. product. and spending shocks Beta 0.50 0.25 0.506 0.465 0.557 0.589 0.567 0.620
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Table A.2.A: Priors and estimated posteriors of the structural parameters using SPF in the set of observables
Priors Posteriors
Sample period: 1981:4-2009:1 SlW-TS model SlW model
Distr Mean Std D. Mean 5% 95% Mean 5% 95%
log data density -853.96 -1070.311
ϕ: cost of adjusting capital Normal 4.00 1.50 5.294 5.168 5.323 4.219 4.192 4.258
h: habit formation Beta 0.70 0.10 0.633 0.611 0.643 0.631 0.607 0.643
σl : Frisch elasticity Normal 2.00 0.75 2.151 2.097 2.219 2.234 2.225 2.370
ξp: price Calvo probability Beta 0.50 0.10 0.715 0.702 0.730 0.617 0.598 0.630
ξw : wage Calvo probability Beta 0.50 0.10 0.259 0.245 0.268 0.495 0.485 0.511
ιw : wage indexation Beta 0.50 0.15 0.400 0.337 0.437 0.218 0.195 0.237
ιp: price indexation Beta 0.50 0.15 0.820 0.796 0.863 0.896 0.884 0.928
ψ: capital utilization adjusting cost Beta 0.50 0.15 0.050 0.046 0.053 0.163 0.153 0.171
Φ : steady state price mark-up Normal 1.25 0.12 1.575 1.504 1.595 1.199 1.152 1.246
rπ : policy rule inflation Normal 1.50 0.25 1.854 1.762 1.888 2.373 2.291 2.394
ρr : policy rule smoothing Beta 0.75 0.10 0.835 0.819 0.849 0.834 0.808 0.845
ry : policy rule output gap Normal 0.12 0.05 0.0823 0.075 0.092 0.080 0.068 0.089
r∆y : policy rule output gap growth Normal 0.12 0.05 0.040 0.035 0.053 0.075 0.068 0.090
rsp: policy rule term spread Normal 0.12 0.05 0.155 0.129 0.174 0.112 0.086 0.145
π: steady-state inflation Gamma 0.62 0.10 0.839 0.826 0.857 0.819 0.809 0.841
100(β−1 − 1): steady-state rate of disc. Gamma 0.25 0.10 1.240 1.219 1.263 1.468 1.454 1.476
l: steady-state labor Normal 0.00 2.00 9.410 9.269 9.585 9.954 9.954 10.102
r{4}: steady-state 1-year yield Normal 0.00 2.00 2.096 2.070 2.138 3.037 3.037 3.310
γ: one plus st-state rate of output growth Normal 0.40 0.10 0.481 0.477 0.487 0.445 0.440 0.454
α: capital share Normal 0.30 0.05 0.192 0.166 0.208 0.138 0.115 0.160
ρ: learning parameter Beta 0.50 0.28 0.961 0.956 0.964 0.973 0.969 0.975
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Table A.2.B: Priors and estimated posteriors of the structural shock process parameters using SPF in the set of observables
Priors Posterior
SlW-TS model SlW model
Distr Mean Std D. Mean 5% 95% Mean 5% 95%
σa: Std. dev. productivity innovation Invgamma 0.10 2.00 0.429 0.405 0.448 0.592 0.579 0.611
σb: Std. dev. risk premium innovation Invgamma 0.10 2.00 0.276 0.253 0.287 0.557 0.511 0.603
σg : Std. dev. exogenous spending innovation Invgamma 0.10 2.00 0.480 0.454 0.513 0.568 0.523 0.564
σi: Std. dev. investment innovation Invgamma 0.10 2.00 0.736 0.708 0.741 0.607 0.568 0.636
σr : Std. dev. monetary policy innovation Invgamma 0.10 2.00 0.110 0.093 0.116 0.130 0.120 0.136
σp: Std. dev. price mark-up innovation Invgamma 0.10 2.00 0.143 0.128 0.153 0.136 0.127 0.143
σw : Std. dev. wage mark-up innovation Invgamma 0.10 2.00 0.880 0.859 0.933 0.784 0.762 0.785
σ
{4}
η : Std. dev. 1-year yield innovation Invgamma 0.10 2.00 0.116 0.106 0.130 0.128 0.120 0.146
ρa: Autoregressive coef. productivity shock Beta 0.50 0.20 0.884 0.872 0.896 0.834 0.804 0.853
ρb: Autoregressive coef. risk-premium shock Beta 0.50 0.20 0.408 0.388 0.443 0.665 0.657 0.678
ρg : Autoregressive coef. exog. spending shock Beta 0.50 0.20 0.990 0.987 0.994 0.992 0.990 0.993
ρi: Autoregressive coef. investment shock Beta 0.50 0.20 0.845 0.841 0.855 0.541 0.521 0.545
ρr : Autoregressive coef. monetary policy shock Beta 0.50 0.20 0.385 0.365 0.414 0.415 0.383 0.452
ρp: Autoregressive coef. price markup shock Beta 0.50 0.20 0.575 0.558 0.602 0.609 0.584 0.690
ρw : Autoregressive coef. wage markup shock Beta 0.50 0.20 0.938 0.929 0.950 0.843 0.833 0.858
ρtp: Autoregressive coef. 1-yr term premium shock Beta 0.50 0.20 0.970 0.959 0.979 0.916 0.885 0.950
µp: MA coef. price markup shock Beta 0.50 0.20 0.744 0.741 0.769 0.590 0.547 0.638
µw : MA coef. wage markup shock Beta 0.50 0.20 0.450 0.422 0.487 0.556 0.543 0.569
ρga: Interact. betw. product. and spending shocks Beta 0.50 0.25 0.661 0.627 0.695 0.661 0.601 0.721
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Table A.2.C: Priors and estimated posteriors of parameters characterizing the measurement errors of SPF observables
Priors Posterior
SlW-TS model SlW model
Distr Mean Std D. Mean 5% 95% Mean 5% 95%
πSPF : SPF steady-state inflation Gamma 0.62 0.10 0.823 0.811 0.838 0.773 0.767 0.789
rSPF : SPF steady-state nominal interest rate Normal 0.00 0.10 2.430 2.414 2.445 2.550 2.520 2.580
γc,SPF : one plus SPF st-state rate of consp. growth Normal 0.40 0.10 0.673 0.662 0.682 0.643 0.628 0.667
γi,SPF : one plus SPF st-state rate of inves. growth Normal 0.40 0.10 0.374 0.329 0.402 0.826 0.798 0.850
σε,π : Std. dev. of inflation forecast error Invgamma 0.10 2.00 0.169 0.164 0.180 0.171 0.169 0.175
σε,c: Std. dev. of consp. growth forecast error Invgamma 0.10 2.00 0.213 0.205 0.221 0.621 0.569 0.645
σε,i: Std. dev. of inves. growth forecast error Invgamma 0.10 2.00 1.084 1.064 1.129 1.057 1.042 1.094
σ
{1}
ε,r : Std. dev. of 1-p-a int. rate forecast error Invgamma 0.10 2.00 0.098 0.086 0.102 0.097 0.093 0.101
σ
{2}
ε,r : Std. dev. of 2-p-a int. rate forecast error Invgamma 0.10 2.00 0.545 0.526 0.578 0.358 0.341 0.365
σ
{3}
ε,r : Std. dev. of 3-p-a int. rate forecast error Invgamma 0.10 2.00 0.597 0.497 0.614 1.193 1.159 1.243
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Appendix Chapter 3
Supplementary appendix (Not intended for publication)
List of new equations in the extended model:




1 + δc(1 + bc)












































































































with β = βγ(1−σc)
-Wage dynamics











































List of parameters A.1. Model parameter description
γ gamma1 Steady-State growth rate
δ delta Capital depreciation rate
gy gy Steady-state exogenous spending-output ratio
σw phiw Steady-state labor mark-up
εp epsilonp Curvature of the Kimball labor good aggregator
εw epsilonw Curvature of the Kimball labor market aggregater
ϕ varphi Steady-state elasticity of the capital adjusment function
h lambda1 Habit formation paramater
σc sigmac Inv. Elasticity of the intertemporal substitution between leisure and work
σl sigmal Inv. Elasticity of labor supply with respect to real wages
ξp xip Calvo probability in prices
ξw xiw Calvo probability in wages
ιw iotaw wage indexation coefficient
ιp iotap price indexation coefficient
ψ psi Elasticity of capital utilization
Φ phip Level of fixed cost (1+level)
rπ rhopi Inflation coefficient in the MPR
ρ rho Smoothing paramater in the MPR
rY rhoy Output gap coefficient in the MPR
π constpi Constant inflation coefficient
100(β−1−1) beta1 Personal discount factor
l constl Constant labor coefficient
100(γ − 1) gamma Steady-state growth rate
α alpha Capital share
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List of parameters A.2 Shock parameters
εat epsa Technology shock
εbt epsb Risk premium shock
εgt epsg Expenditure shock
εit epsi Investment adjustment shock
εRt epsr Monetary policy shock
εwt epsw Wage mark-up shock
εpt epsp Price mark-up shock
εyt,t+S eyr Output revision shock
επt,t+S epir Inflation revision shock
εct,t+S ecr Consumption revision shock
σa stderr e_a Standard deviation of productivity innovation
σb stderr e_b Standard deviation of risk premium innovation
σg stderr e_g Standard deviation of exogenous spending innovation
σi stderr e_i Standard deviation of investment-specific innovation
σR stderr e_r Standard deviation of monetary policy rule innovation
σp stderr e_p Standard deviation of price mark-up innovation
σw stderr e_w Standard deviation of wage mark-up innovation
σry stderr e_yr Standard deviation of output revision innovation
σrπ stderr e_pir Standard deviation of inflation revision innovation
σrc stderr e_cr Standard deviation of consumption revision innovation
ρa rhoa AR coefficient of productivity shock
ρb rhob AR coefficient of risk premium shock
ρg rhog AR coefficient of exogenous spending shock
ρi rhoi AR coefficient of investment-specific shock
ρR rhor AR coefficient of policy rule shock
ρp rhop AR coefficient of price mark-up shock
ρw rhow AR coefficient of wage mark-up shock
µp cmap MA coefficient of price mark-up shock
µw cmaw MA coefficient of wage mark-up shock
ρga rhoga Correlation coefficient between productivity and exogenous spending shocks
ρyr rhoyr AR coefficient of output revision shock
ρπr rhopir AR coefficient of inflation revision shock
ρcr rhocr AR coefficient of consumption revision shock
by byy Coefficient measuring the correlation between the initial announcement and revision
bπ bpipi Coefficient measuring the correlation between the initial announcement and revision
bc bcc Coefficient measuring the correlation between the initial announcement and revision
δy deltay Coefficient of the lagged revision in the output revision
δc deltac Coefficient of the lagged revision in the consumption revision
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zt z Capital utilization rate
lt l Employment level
Rt r Interest rate
πt pi Inflation
qt q Capital value
rkt rk Rental rate of capital
kst ks Capital supply
kt k Capital
µwt muw Wage mark-up
µpt mup Prices mark-up
wt w Wages
yrt yr Real-time output
πrt pir Real-time inflation
crt cr Real-time consumption
ryt ry Output revision
rct rc Consumption revision
rπt rpi Inflation revision
ypt yp Potential Output
ipt ip Potential interest rate
zpt zp Potential capital utilization rate
lpt lp Potential employment
Rpt rp Potential interest rate
πpt pip Potential inflation
qpt qp Potential capital value
rk,pt rkp Potential capital interest rate
ks,pt ksp Potential capital supply
kpt kp Potential capital
wpt wp Potential wages
List of variables B.2 Exogenous variables: Shocks
εat epsa Tecnhology shock
εbt epsb Risk premium shock
εgt epsg Expenditure shock
εit epsi Investment adjustment shock
εRt epsr Monetary policy shock
εwt epsw Wage mark-up shock
εpt epsp Price mark-up shock
εyt,t+S eyr Output revision shock
επt,t+S epir Inflation revision shock
εct,t+S ecr Consumption revision shock
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List of variables B.3 Predeterminated variables
ct−1, it−1, kt−1, πt−1, wt−1, Rt−1, yt−1, yrt−1, πrt−1,
crt−1, r
y
t−1, rπt−1, rct−1, c
p
t−1, i
p
t−1, k
p
t−1, r
p
t−1
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